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This thesis is a discussion of several world issues on which anthropology has greatly 
informed my perspectives. When asked why I wrote this particular thesis, the answer 
is out of a very simple wish to show what anthropology has to offer in terms of 
understanding international issues. When asked how anthropology has taught me to 
think and see the world, there is no clearer demonstration than this paper.
I am greatly indebted…
To my family. Thank you not only for your love and support, but also for your 
understanding – your eager ears that heard my thoughts and your open minds that 
encouraged my dreams. These were unequivocally the tools passed on to me that have 
led me to pursue a career in human relations. 
To friends near and far: those in Lawrence, KS, Chicago, New York, Tampa and 
Seattle. You have all been there to listen to my thoughts, complaints, rants and 
conclusions, and whether you followed my train of thought or not, I thank you for 
lending me a metaphorical soap box on which to ponder this topic. I thank you even 
more for offering up your opinion over long nights of conversation. Your 
perspectives and arguments not only challenged my own, but found their way into my 
work as well.
To my professors and mentors. I can not thank Allan Hanson enough for his 
unyielding support and ability to make me think critically about my own arguments. I 
could not have asked for a more dedicated advisor. Jane Gibson and Brent Metz 
asked the right questions that evaded me and encouraged me to consider my topic in 
broader terms. Thank you.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
September 11, 2001 is a marked day for people and policy in the United 
States. From that day forward stricter airline security, communications surveillance, 
and identification cards were all implemented to protect the U.S. from another 
terrorist attack. Stricter immigration policy was also promoted as The U.S. 9/11 
Commission on Border Control (2004:570) revealed that 15 of the 19 hijackers could 
have been intercepted by border authorities, thwarting the attacks well in advance. 
The U.S. government’s response to this information has been to create an institutional 
link between immigration and terrorism. Since 9/11, U.S. anti-terror and immigration 
policies have been defensive and have focused on addressing these two spuriously 
related issues with one solution (immigration reform). This method of defense is 
counterproductive, as it amasses much larger “haystacks” of suspects (who are 
suspect only in the sense that they are immigrants) in which the proverbial needle, a 
terrorist, might be found (Suro 2003). Karen Tumlin (2004) also argues that 
immigration reform has exacerbated anxieties about the “foreign born” in the U.S. 
Moreover, this defense strategy shows that the U.S. has not adequately considered 
reasons behind al Qaeda’s attacks or behind immigration. Thus, while the government 
continues to suspect another terrorist attack and many U.S. citizens have become 
alarmed at the number of migrants entering the U.S. on a daily basis, terrorism and 
immigration have become superficially and ineffectually conflated as “threats” in the 
public’s consciousness.
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In this paper, I show that immigration to and terrorism against the U.S. should 
not be linked simply because some of those who attacked the U.S. on 9/11 were also 
immigrants. Because the 9/11 terrorist pilots lived in the U.S. between 1997 and 
2000, trained on their mission to topple the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
and were likely successful because of this training in their target country,  the U.S. 
government has made strict reforms in immigration to battle terrorism. However, one 
piece of information seems to have been overlooked: the majority of the 9/11 
attackers were by label mere travelers. In the year 2007 alone, the U.S. welcomed “56 
million international visitors from 213 countries” (U.S. Department of Commerce 
International Trade Administration 2008:1). Given this information, it is difficult to 
imagine how even heightened security checkpoints have filtered through so many 
individuals to find those, if any, who are determined to attack the U.S. And, while the 
U.S. has not suffered another monumental terrorist attack since 9/11, other countries 
have. The argument may be made that the U.S. government’s strict security has
warded off other attacks on the mainland, but even then, as Karen Tumlin (2004) 
argues, the government has not specifically commented on any thwarted attacks. As 
long as the circumstances remain that encourage individuals to employ terrorist 
activity, weaknesses will be found and new methods discovered to attack.
One solution to this issue of mass immigration and visitation to the U.S. and 
the potential for other terrorist attacks specifically on the U.S. is to recognize where
immigration to and terrorism against the U.S. are most deeply related. I propose a link 
between immigration and terrorism in the U.S. that is an underlying cause of why 
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people migrate to the U.S. and why people terrorize the U.S. This cause is 
imperialism. Yes, this is an extremely broad cause to be so plainly stated: imperialism
is rampant around the world and has taken on several forms throughout history. But 
to pinpoint one instance of imperialism as a cause of issues around the world such as 
immigration and terrorism in the U.S. oversimplifies the complex interrelatedness of 
phenomena contributing to these events. 
Today, one key contributor to imperialism throughout the world is neoliberal 
economic policy. In brief, neoliberalism is a philosophy that diminishes “government 
interventions in the market” and “eschews social and collective controls” over the 
practices of corporations in promises of “unleashing” the healing and wealth-
producing power of a free market economy around the world (Heynen et al. 2007:3). 
Neoliberal policy is administered by a number of transnational corporations and 
financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and is enforced by governments in the G7. In countries where neoliberal 
structural adjustments have been made, the institutionalization of structural violence 
against the people of these countries has often ensued. Structural violence is defined 
as violence within a social institution or structure that systematically decreases the 
quality of life and/or kills individuals by limiting their access to basic needs (Galtung 
1978). People respond in various ways to the extreme economic and social disparities 
caused by structural violence. In some cases the response is with migration. In others, 
it is with terrorism. There are also other ways to react to structural violence, but, for 
the purposes of this paper, I only discuss immigration and terrorism and their relation 
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to neoliberalism and structural violence to exemplify how phenomena around the 
world are interconnected. If, for instance, the U.S. government were more aware of 
the relationship between global phenomena such as immigration and terrorism, it 
might not experience both phenomena as a double threat. I argue that the U.S. will 
have more control over its experiences of these phenomena when it adopts a more 
holistic approach to international policy that recognizes these relations.
I start by showing historical instances of imperialism and the emergence and 
effects of structural violence in Saudi Arabia and Mexico. It is most likely clear why I 
discuss Saudi Arabia: the majority of the 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia. But 
why I have chosen Mexico may be less obvious. After all, no one really expects a 
catastrophic attack like 9/11 to originate from Mexico. Yet, American rhetoric and 
U.S. policy since 9/11 have suggested all immigrants are potential terrorists 
(Hayworth 2006; Tumlin 2004). Thus, I discuss imperialism in Mexico because it is 
from Mexico that the U.S. receives its largest immigrant population. And U.S. 
counter-terror policy has not discriminated against these migrants. 
After discussing historical imperialism in each country, I explain how 
neoliberal economic policy has aggravated these situations. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, historic imperialism has occurred with the help of international interests in 
oil, the corrupt Saudi monarchy, Saudi Arabia’s overconfidence in oil revenues
beginning with 1973 oil embargo, and its oil bust from 1984 to 1996. The U.S.’s role 
in this imperialism has much to do with what has been known as its “special” 
relationship with Saudi Arabia. Until 2001, the U.S. influenced Saudi Arabian policy 
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on oil-production to be a “swing producer” of oil in the Middle East, maintaining the 
U.S. dominated corporate oil profits and “stabilizing” the global economy. In 
exchange, the U.S. lent Saudi Arabia its economic and military support. Thus, at the 
onset of its oil crisis in 1984, at the insistence of the U.S. and the IMF, Saudi Arabia 
agreed to slow its oil production to curb the oil price crisis. Saudi Arabia’s revenues, 
however, took a plunge due to this effort and plunged even further when the country 
began producing as usual again. To recover, Saudi Arabia followed advisories from 
the IMF and the World Bank (two institutions on whose board of directors Saudi 
Arabia served and which Saudi Arabia had generously funded) to adopt structural 
adjustment policies and fully integrate  Saudi Arabia into the global economy.
Acceptance of these structural adjustment policies bolstered Saudi Arabia’s 
corrupt monarchy, weakened the Saudi state, exacerbated structural violence and gave 
rise to resistance within the country. In response to these crises, instead of addressing 
these antagonizing international policies, the Saudi government accepted more 
neoliberal structural adjustments when it joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2000. Reacting to these policies, the Saudi public began violently attacking 
the Saudi state. In response, those G7 countries with vested interests in neoliberal 
Saudi Arabian policies deployed troops to Saudi Arabia and the surrounding area to 
control public dissent in the Middle East. 
This caused the Saudi public to seek retribution against those perpetuating 
Saudi abuse. The U.S. was one such participant in this imperialism. U.S. forces have 
occupied Saudi Arabia, considered a holy land by many of the Muslim faith, since the 
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first Gulf War in efforts to provide political stability within the region and protect its 
interests in oil. Secondly, the U.S.’s abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet-
Afghan war and the U.S.’s support for Israel and its relative silence regarding Israel’s 
expansion into Palestine has given many in the Middle East a reason to be frustrated 
with U.S. international policy. For these reasons, fourteen Saudi Arabian citizens 
became motivated and dealt the U.S. a vengeful blow on September 11, 2001.
Likewise, the area and people of Mexico have suffered imperialism since the 
conquistadores first arrived in 1519. And, recently, to service its national debt and 
recover from the oil price crisis of the 1980s, Mexico agreed to neoliberal structural 
adjustments to receive loans from both the IMF and the World Bank. These reforms 
resulted in structural violence as they fragmented and eliminated important public 
services once provided by the state and further disenfranchised Mexico’s poorest of 
the poor. During this time, Mexico also signed on with the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the U.S. and Canada. NAFTA had monumental 
effects on Mexico’s already failing economy. As a result, Mexico’s work 
environment drastically changed as trade liberalization, foreign investment and 
development greatly altered Mexico’s industries and work became scarce while the 
population continued to grow (Carrera 2002). To cope with these issues, Mexicans 
have sought immigration to the U.S. to alleviate the effects of Mexico’s economy on 
their lives.
In each case, we will see that recent imperialism in the form of neoliberal 
economics and the U.S.’s international policy has contributed to the U.S.’s experience 
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of terrorism and immigration. Given these similarities, if the goal of U.S. policy is to 
curb immigration to and terrorism against the U.S., then a step in the right direction
would be to adjust U.S. policy to reduce and prevent the circumstances that drive 
individuals to migrate to or turn to terrorism against the U.S. in the first place. To do 
this, a paradigm shift in how we view the causes of international conflict is necessary 
– a shift away from individualistic perspectives about the world and toward 
recognition of the interrelatedness of international activity such as foreign policy, 
terrorism and immigration.
Problems with U.S. policy on Terrorism and Immigration Today 
After September 11, conventional wisdom aimed to strengthen border security 
to prevent another terror attack. Overall, strategies the U.S. government adopted to 
fight potential terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have included increased border patrol, the 
Patriot Act, “targeting travel,” “biometric screening systems,” screening systems for 
transportation and access to facilities, and increased communication between 
countries about suspected terrorists (The U.S. 9/11 Commission on Border Control 
2004). President Bush also announced the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and charged it with both immigration and counterterrorism 
responsibilities. Today, the DHS includes the “Secret Service, the Border Patrol, the 
new Immigration and Customs Enforcement, [and] the U.S. Customs Service” (White 
2006:314). Abroad, conventional methods for counterterrorism against al Qaeda have 
included seeking out and killing al Qaeda leaders, assuming that once the head of al 
Qaeda is removed, the body of terrorism will wither. Lastly, “terror camps” have been 
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destroyed and pressure has been put on countries suspected to house terrorists 
(Sageman 2004). 
There are several problems with these solutions. First, Karen Tumlin 
(2004:1178) critiques immigration reform and the creation of the DHS, arguing 
“immigration and immigrant policy has been conflated with and subordinated to 
terrorism policy goals…[through] the abolition of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS),…and the transfer of most of its authority to the newly created DHS.” 
Tumlin’s argument was demonstrated as, after 9/11, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
began looking for reasons to deport individuals, so that when they transgressed 
immigration technicalities (such as failing to maintain an adequate number of college 
units on a student visa), they would be deported as criminals, guilty of violating
immigration law. (Tumlin 2004:1188). Part of this mission, then, has also been to 
locate and apprehend 314,000 ‘immigrant fugitives’ who have violated these U.S. 
immigration laws. Most interesting is the fact that the overwhelming majority of these 
314,000 people are “Latin Americans,” while less than 2% (6,000 immigrants) are 
from “Muslim” nations (Tumlin 2004:1189). 
This information goes against the logic that terrorism should be fought on the 
home front through immigration reform, as we have obviously rounded up or are 
seeking more Latin Americans than individuals from “terror-housing” countries. The 
government’s refusal to comment on immigrants being deported or brought in for 
questioning also makes it difficult to judge if new immigration policies are effectively 
fighting the War on Terror or not (Tumlin 2004). Thus, there is a distinct disconnect 
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between the War on Terror and immigration reform, yet Tumlin’s data show that 
immigration violations are becoming “proxies” for terrorist activities. Tumlin (2004) 
also argues this conflation has left an indelible mark of xenophobia on our 
perceptions of migrants. Fears about the threat of immigrants have been exacerbated, 
and people are calling for tighter border security against cultural impurity, language 
impurity, unemployment and physical and political insecurity (Huntington 2004; 
Appadurai 2006; Lutton and Tanton 1994; Hayworth 2006). 
Another problem with U.S. government strategies to curb terror and 
immigration is that they are defensive (not preventive), addressing how the U.S. will 
respond once individuals have made the decision to become part of a “terrorist” effort 
or to migrate. The U.S. 9/11 Commission on Border Control (2004:572) states “The 
9/11 experience shows that terrorists study and exploit America’s vulnerabilities.” 
Without oversimplifying, the same could be argued of illegal immigrants. As 
Hayworth (2006:80) notes, guides to help migrants cross the border have surfaced, 
advising them to continue trying if caught crossing the border and to “avoid attracting
attention” by over-celebrating once successfully crossing the border. The will of the 
terrorist and migrant to capitalize on the U.S.’s vulnerabilities will not subside as long 
as circumstances remain in their lives that provoke such behavior.
Another problem with U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism appears to 
result from a superficial or ethnocentric understanding of these issues. Religious 
fanaticism, social instability and irresponsibility seem to characterize current 
explanations of terrorism and immigration. Interestingly, stability and responsibility 
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are both ideals championed by the American dream and our legendary individualism. 
These notions appear to have implications for how terrorism and immigration in the 
U.S. have been explained. For instance, in President George W. Bush’s statements, 
September 11 is explained in terms of individuals who hate the U.S. for its ideals of 
freedom: “They [terrorists] hate what we see right here in this chamber – a 
democratically elected government…They hate our freedoms – our freedom of 
religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with 
each other” (Bush 2001). President Bush also criticized those who have considered 
diplomacy as a solution to terrorism, alluding to the idea that terrorists are 
uninterested in negotiation and live by selfish and inflexible agendas: “Some seem to 
believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals as if some ingenious 
argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. We’ve heard this 
foolish delusion before” (Bush 2008). In the case of immigration, J.D. Hayworth 
(2006) also writes that migrants would rather feed off the economy of the U.S. than 
take responsibility and solve their own political and economic problems. 
In each explanation, the themes of individual responsibility are prevalent. In 
the case of terrorism, the belief is prevalent that terrorist religious fanaticism, hatred 
and jealousy of the U.S. are issues over which only terrorists have control. On the 
same note, immigrants are said to come to the U.S. to reap the benefits of America 
because they are too “lazy” to fix their own countries. And in the case of both terror-
housing and immigrant sending countries, these countries are to blame for poor 
adaptation to the changing world and poor management of their own social and 
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political affairs, whether due to lack of economic intelligence or a “backwards” 
culture (Friedman 2005). These explanations inhibit our understanding of the 
decisions to migrate or terrorize. There are reasons, much broader than personal 
agendas, which drive individuals to migrate and terrorism. 
A final problem with U.S. policy on terrorism in particular is that terrorism is 
a global phenomenon, requiring recognition of multiple global causes and use of 
cooperative responses. As Sageman (2004) states, al Qaeda is a globalized 
organization that has no association with any particular state and has decentralized 
power. Thus, in theory, if Osama bin Laden were captured, al Qaeda’s structure 
would allow the organization to live on without its leading spokesperson (Sageman 
2004). For this reason, conventional methods of counterterrorism to dismantle al 
Qaeda such as going after bin Laden and attacking the states of Iraq and Afghanistan 
have been unsuccessful. Al Qaeda is still at work, having claimed responsibility for 
the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the July 2005 mass transit bombings in 
London, and the April 2007 bombings of the prime minister’s office and a police 
station in Algiers.
Solutions for U.S. Policy on Terrorism and Immigration:
Investigation of the reasons behind terrorism and immigration shows that a 
more useful solution to these issues would be a deeper understanding of the 
interrelatedness of causes between the two and the adoption of preventive measures 
for each issue. Nassar (2005) writes that the phenomenon of globalization, by virtue 
of putting developed and developing worlds in contact with one another, spreads 
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dreams and nightmares about the quality of life. When “nightmares” of imperialism
and necessity occur, Nassar (2005) states that terrorism and, as I argue, immigration 
can occur in response. For the purposes of this paper, globalization is defined in terms 
of trade liberalization, where trade restrictions are removed, “creating an 
open…world economy and economic integration between First and Third world 
economies” (Nassar 2005:5). Nassar (2005), however, takes issue, as I do, with what 
some may believe globalization to be and how it actually functions. In my argument,
contrary to more optimistic views, globalization and its neoliberal philosophy have 
contributed to the rise of immigration and terrorism in the U.S. One essential 
element to my argument, however, is an understanding that phenomena such as 
neoliberal philosophy, globalization, immigration and terrorism did not happen 
overnight. They all developed over the course of the development of a world market. 
The precursor to neoliberal economics, for instance, was laissez-faire economics. The 
French phrase laissez-faire literally translates to “let do” (Kegley and Wittkopf 
2001:251). Twentieth century advocates of laissez-faire, now neoliberal economics,
attributed the concept of the “invisible hand of the market” to 18th century Scottish 
economist Adam Smith. But while Smith wrote about an “invisible hand,” he never 
assigned ownership to the capitalist market. As Lubasz (1998) argues, Smith was a 
religious man whose “invisible hand” referred to God's influence on the economic 
behaviors of moral individuals. The 20th century discursive maneuver legitimized the 
amoral, unregulated marketplace of laissez-faire economics whereby self-interested 
behavior in an unregulated market would produce the greatest happiness of all. Thus, 
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where Smith believed the costs of a free-market would be averted by the decisions of 
moral individuals, neoliberals see the free market as the domain of self-interested 
individuals and as an amoral arbiter of the distribution of goods and services, a feat 
accomplished most efficiently when “let alone.”
Overall, laissez-faire refers to an economic system with no state regulation. 
This system emerged in response to the subsidies and discriminatory economic 
measures of mercantilism after the decline of feudalism (“a political system in which 
village farmers occupy lands owned by local lords to whom they owe loyalty, rent 
and service”) in the 1500s (Bodley 2005:253; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001:253). By the 
19th century, laissez-faire economics was the standard for Western economics, until, 
in the early 1900’s, when heads of industries began abusing this freedom, seeking to 
accumulate large monopolies, paying non-living wages, providing little security or 
safety for workers, and severely throwing off the distribution of wealth in general
(Bodley 2005; Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). Governments around the world then 
began to intervene in these economic practices, creating factory laws and consumer 
protection laws and limiting the growth of monopolies. To address these issues, 
several monopolies were dismantled and several industries and services were 
nationalized around the world. Keynesian economics took over, supporting 
government intervention in the market, as a response to the great depression of the 
1930’s. However, by the 1970’s laissez-faire economics made a comeback and was
reinvented as neoliberal economics in the 1980’s (Bodley 2005; Kegley and Wittkopf 
2001).
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Neoliberalism is defined by Kegley and Wittkopf (2001:G10) as “a 
philosophy which maintains that peaceful change with prosperity can be encouraged 
through cooperation in institutions that knit the states and peoples of the world 
together into a true global economy.” Like Nassar (2005), I find the theory to this 
philosophy honorable and the practice, questionable. Heynen et al. (2007:5) argue 
that neoliberalism has been championed as “a global project to restore, renew, and 
expand the conditions for capital accumulation.” The authors, however, also 
recognize that while the goal of neoliberalism is to accumulate and grow wealth, the 
means of neoliberalism involve “economic elites more or less intentionally seek[ing] 
to increase their wealth and income…” and “their political and economic freedom and 
flexibility by rolling back the redistributive reforms of the mid-twentieth century 
(particularly those reforms adopted in the aftermath of the global Great Depression of 
the 1930s)” (Heynen et al 2007:5). Kiely (2007) also writes that neoliberalism
happened in tandem with the debt and oil crises of the 1980s, where countries were 
no longer able to repay development debts and oil profits had declined. Interestingly, 
neoliberal rhetoric about the debt crisis of the 1980s blamed indebted countries for 
their situations: 
Countries that faced severe balance of payment deficits, and therefore faced 
difficulties in meeting their interest-payment obligations, were said to have 
adopted incorrect policies. Countries were therefore in debt, not because of 
the international economy, but because of the bad policies that they 
themselves had adopted…The neo-liberal assumption was that the bad 
policies were rooted in too much government intervention in these economies 
(Kiely 2007:69).
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Conversely, Harris and Seid (2000) write that those countries that did reduce 
government intervention in their economies by accepting neoliberal policy, had their 
political, social, and economic destinies pulled from their hands. Transnational 
organizations took over, persuading the economic superpowers of the world and 
worldwide trade and financial organizations like the IMF and the World Bank to 
force indebted countries to abolish regulations that once protected domestic life from 
unequal competition with international trade and investment (Harris and Seid 
2000:7). With this accomplished, Schaeffer (2005:80) writes the IMF and the World 
Bank then offered relief from the debt crises with loans to rescue the economies of 
indebted countries. There were, however, several stipulations, or what Thomas 
Friedman (1999:86-87) refers to as the “golden rules,” to these loans being awarded 
that included:
 decreases in “state taxation” and “redistributive spending;” “privatization of 
services” once offered by the state;
 implementation of private and individual property rights;
 liberalization of state restrictions on international trade and investment;
 cutbacks on statewide social services;
 emphasis on private influence over “economic, environmental, and social 
action” of the state;
 decentralization of government authority and “recruitment” of volunteer 
organizations to provide social services (adapted from Heynen et al. 2007:6).
 reorientation of economies toward exports and reduction of wages to make 
exports competitive in the global market (Harris and Seid 2000:9).
In so doing, transnational organizations remade “the economies of debtor countries 
along neoliberal market lines” (Schaeffer 2005:80). The IMF and the World Bank 
(the monetary institutions that represented these organizations) then became 
transnational monetary strong-arms that forced countries in need to make a choice. 
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They could 1) mortgage their economic resources, allowing multinational 
corporations to gain access to those resources while imposing monetary structural 
adjustments and austerity plans to restructure national economies and enable 
countries to repay their debts with interest (Schaeffer 2005:80, Harris and Seid 
2000:7). Or they could 2) risk exclusion from a fast-developing global economy 
through a loss of purchasing power through inflation leading to a devaluation of 
currencies and internal economic chaos, isolation and collapse. In this way, Harris 
and Seid (2000:7) state that “through loans, investments, purchasing agreements, 
patent controls and licenses transnational capitalist corporations gained dominance” 
over the economies of developing countries and their state projects and public utilities 
(Harris and Seid 2000:8).
Because of these concessions, neoliberal policy has come at severe human 
costs, including decreased wages, “continued high unemployment, the reduction of 
social benefits for the poorer sectors of the population” (Harris and Seid 2000:14). 
The informal sector has also grown as an adaptation to these capitalist policies. In this 
way, the neoliberal philosophy itself is a “rhetorical project harnessed to certain 
mechanisms of social control, which are at odds with the actual mechanisms by which 
labor, capital, and other markets work…” (Nomini 2003:165). In the end, 
neoliberalism is still capitalist and functions on the basis of inequality. As Heynen et 
al. (2007) note, neoliberalism, then, generally amounts to more wealth and power for 
elites and the realization of “false promises” of social and economic mobility and 
even worse futures for the poor. Neoliberalism, then, achieves a series of chronic, 
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unrealized promises and dreams and societal insecurities, amounting to structural 
violence against individuals.
The concept of structural violence is generally attributed to Johan Galtung, a 
sociologist, who came up with the phrase during the 1970s. In his book Peace and 
Social Structure: Essays in Peace Research, Galtung (1978) defined structural 
violence as violence within a social institution or structure that systematically 
decreases the quality of life and/or kills individuals by limiting their access to basic 
needs. To this definition Chasin (1997) added, “The structural approach to 
violence…stresses the ways in which the distribution of wealth and power influence 
behavior.” Examples of structural violence are forms of racism, heterosexism, 
classism, and ethnocentrism that have been institutionalized in national or 
international policy. 
Schiller and Fouron (2003:206) state, structural violence, while “a less visible 
form” of violence, “can be deadly and can affect large numbers of people around the 
world.” In effect, structural violence is manifest in “deprivations of food, health care, 
education and other resources necessary for human life and development that leads 
[sic] to physical disability, the destruction of human potential and death” (Schiller 
and Fouron 2003:206). Thus, effects of structural violence on individuals may be seen 
in “disease and death, unemployment, homelessness, lack of education, 
powerlessness, a shared fate of misery, and the day-by-day violence of hunger, thirst 
and bodily pain” (Kleinman 1997:227).
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Paul Farmer (1997:263) also states that in structural violence the source of 
suffering is one’s low position in inegalitarian societies, determined by “large-scale 
social forces”…which are “structured by historically given (and often economically 
driven) processes and forces that conspire – whether through routine, [or] ritual…– to 
constrain [the] agency” of individuals. Farmer’s assertion is pertinent for two reasons. 
The first is that Farmer identifies broader factors, including history, as determinants 
of an individual’s experience of structural violence. Secondly and simultaneously, 
Farmer recognizes that these broader factors limit human agency within such a 
system. In this way, structural violence involves an interrelatedness of issues of both 
global and local proportions that have serious implications for individuals. 
Continuing from this discussion about human agency, the last piece of the 
definition of structural violence is captured by Howard Winant (2005) as he discusses 
U.S. economic interests in the Middle East. Historically, the U.S. has enforced its 
interests using economic pressures such as sanctions and trade embargos. However, 
most recently, the U.S. has used military occupation of the Middle East. Today, 
though former President Bush has argued the contrary, “[s]elf-rule” of Iraq “is not 
around the corner: the domination of Iraq and exploitation of the country’s resources 
are well underway, under the auspices of the U.S. military and favored U.S. 
corporations” (Winant 2005:121). 
In fact, the demise of self-rule as a characteristic of U.S. policy in the Middle 
East is quite obvious when one considers the political and economic activity 
surrounding oil in the Middle East. Threats to oil profits have been rampant and U.S. 
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policy has responded to each. In the 1950s, Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mosaddeq was overthrown by both the CIA and British forces after he nationalized 
oil industries in Iran. But threats to U.S. oil interests did not end there. In 1960, the 
founding of The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), created
an alliance of petroleum producing countries to ensure that oil remained a stable 
market that would produce wealth for member states. Then, in 1973, OPEC 
embargoed the U.S. for its support of Israel, removing a significant amount of control 
over the oil industry from the hands of investors. And a year before that, in 1972, the 
Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company was nationalized by Ahmad al-Bakr of the 
Ba’ath party, suffering the U.S. an especially detrimental loss to its share of oil profits 
(Hinnebusch 2007). 
Finally, U.S. policy makers have said their oil interests were further 
challenged when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and Saudi Arabia’s oil fields were at 
risk of being overtaken (Bronson 2005). However, several have argued that U.S. 
Ambassador April Glaspie gave Iraq the “green light” to invade Kuwait when Glaspie 
stated in her meeting with Hussein and his Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, on 
July 25, 1990
…we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border 
disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during 
the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should 
express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with 
America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this 
instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods 
via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are 
solved quickly (Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy
1990:6).
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Some have argued Glaspie’s statement of the U.S.’s indifference gave the “go-ahead”
to Iraq and gave the U.S. a reason to eventually invade Iraq and reconquer Iraq’s oil 
fields. The stage was set for invasion when the U.S. sent troops to Saudi Arabia, but 
the opportunity had not yet presented itself for the U.S. to change Iraqi policy 
regarding oil. This came about after September 11, 2001 when President Bush 
announced the U.S. would invade Iraq to disarm the country of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs), oust Saddam Hussein from office, address al Qaeda links with 
Iraq and free the Iraqi people. Upon arrival, however, U.S. troops acted and were 
received more as subjugators than liberators (Winant 2005). Later, when Bush 
admitted that no WMDs were ever found in Iraq, ulterior motives for the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq came to light. When U.S. troops finally cleared out the ruling party of 
Iraq, plans were made to build a more oil-cooperative country. 
These plans, however, have been enforced by the barrel of a gun and have
incited Iraqi anger. As a result, President Bush’s plans for peace were repeatedly 
revised as the departure of U.S. troops from Iraq continued to increase. Present 
arrangements with Iraq also highlight self-serving interests of the U.S. As Andrew 
Kramer of the New York Times reported in June of 2008, “Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total 
and BP — the original partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company — along with 
Chevron and a number of smaller oil companies, are in talks with Iraq’s Oil Ministry 
for no-bid contracts to service Iraq’s largest fields” (1). These talks will reinstate U.S. 
and British oil corporation power in Iraq 37 years after it was ousted by al-Bakr’s 
nationalization. 
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Under the George W. Bush administration, the suppression of Iraqi resistance 
and the fact that these companies were talks with Iraq’s Oil Ministry about servicing 
Iraq’s oil fields as of June 2008 demonstrates Winant’s point about self-rule and how 
neoliberal policy, transnational corporate activity and U.S. economic policy have
engendered structural violence and physical violence in the Middle East. It is not 
necessarily that individuals directly experience the overpowering pull of global forces 
such as U.S. economic policy. Rather, the individual experiences the inability or 
unwillingness of the state to respond to his or her needs due to broader international 
influences. 
Neoliberalism, Structural Violence and the State:
Following Bourdieu (1998), I argue, that the power of the state is undermined 
by neoliberal economic policy. Bourdieu (1998:33) maintains that “the state exists in 
two forms: in objective reality, in the form of a set of institutions such as rules, 
agencies, offices, etc., and also in people’s minds.” James H. Smith (2007) discussed 
these conceptualizations and neoliberalism’s effect on them in the article “Buying a 
Better Witch Doctor: Witch-Finding, Neoliberalism, and the Development 
Imagination in the Taita Hills, Kenya.” Smith (2007:174) found that people in the 
Taita Hills of Kenya were experiencing “the erosion of local social and moral 
boundaries, under conditions defined…by recent economic and political 
liberalization.” The withdrawal of foreign aid, a drop in the export price of coffee, a 
decline in tourism (due to crime and ethnic violence), “the cutting of public services,” 
“the privatization of public institutions,” and the “downsizing of state bureaucracies” 
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were all contributing to hardships for the Kenyan people and the elimination of the 
Kenyan state as a useful institution and a source of power in the minds of Kenyans 
(Smith 2007:178). 
Because neoliberalism has these effects on the state, Bourdieu (1998:41) 
argues, “the dominated groups in society have an interest in defending the state [from 
regression], particularly in its social aspect. This defence of the state is not inspired 
by nationalism.” This defense is, in fact, inspired by people valuing the state as an 
institution that protects one’s immediate survival in life and in labor. In the case of 
terrorism, when the state is threatened by neoliberalism, Bourdieu (1998:20) claims 
that people become frustrated at their government’s inability or unwillingness to 
“stand up” to neoliberal rationalism and its resulting structural violence, enforced by 
economic and political elites, transnational and financial corporations, and 
superpowers. These groups, then, organize to fight what they perceive to be the 
source of their problems: the U.S., being an enforcer of these economic policies in the 
Middle East, has become one of their targets. Likewise, in the case of immigration, 
groups concede to move with the flow of these recent neoliberal policies and migrate 
where they may be readily hired to address the structural violence in their lives and 
their states. 
Research Methodology
The research for my argument is comprised of popular, philosophical and 
academic sources. The popular literature is represented by the views of Samuel 
Huntington (2004a;2004b;1993;1968) and Thomas L. Friedman (2005). The 
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philosophical literature is represented by Pierre Bourdieu (2004;1998) and Jamal R. 
Nassar (2005). I have selected these individuals as their works cover a large spectrum 
of political positions on the subjects of immigration and terrorism. I have also 
incorporated public statements and news releases from individuals such as 
Congressman J.D. Hayworth (2006), former President Bush (2008; 2001), and new 
President Barack Obama (qtd. in Carrigan 2008) on attitudes about developments in 
U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism. 
In Chapter Two, I compare this rhetoric to academic studies by Robert A. 
Pape (2005), Marc Sageman (2004), and Christopher Hewitt (2002) on factors 
influencing the turn to terrorism. I then continue to identify the causes of terrorism 
against the U.S., considering historical U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia by using 
historical accounts of Saudi Arabia by Bronson (2005), Meijer (2005), Aarts (2005) 
and Sager (2005). In Chapter Three, I also compare the above mentioned rhetoric on 
immigration to studies by Maria Cruz-Torres (2001), Jeffrey Cohen (2007) and 
Nancy Johnson (2001). To identify causes of immigration to the U.S., I explore 
historical U.S. relations with Mexico by using Raat (2004), Castaño (1984) and Roett 
(1988). These comparisons of rhetoric with scientific studies and historical accounts 
are used to underscore commonly held misconceptions about the causes of terrorism 
and immigration. 
Before continuing with my methodology, I must, however, address two issues 
involving my discussion of the above-mentioned rhetoric. First, because I critique the 
policies of the Bush administration that address immigration and terrorism in the 
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U.S., I largely present and deconstruct the political rhetoric put forth that supported 
these policies. I do not deny there is an equal amount of rhetoric on both sides of the 
immigration and terrorism debate. Second, I must address the apprehensiveness about 
using rhetoric for data. My research has shown that it is difficult to break down the 
reasoning connecting immigration and terrorism in the U.S. How does one determine 
what is legitimate concern or fear and what is simply political agenda? For instance, 
the tie between immigration and terrorism results from the fact that some of the 9/11 
terrorists did migrate across U.S. borders, long before the actual attacks, to begin 
preparations. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (2004) found, al Qaeda trainees Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad 
Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Midhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi were all granted 
student visas to go to flight schools in Arizona, California, and Florida between 1997 
and 2000. Terrorism and immigration were further conflated when information 
surfaced showing the U.S.’s southern border with Mexico to be an increasingly easy 
one to cross. The U.S. Census Bureau states that of the 1.3 million increase in the 
Hispanic population from July of 2004 to July of 2005, 500,000 may be attributed to 
immigration (Bernstein 2006:2). Moreover, the 9/11 Commission on Border Control 
(2004:569) states, “For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.” 
This information has given rise to a number of ideas, brimming with rhetoric, 
about the U.S.’s vulnerability to and responsibility for immigration and terrorist 
threats. Political figures such as J.D. Hayworth (2006:5) have stated that the U.S.-
Mexican border is a way in for terrorists: “a determined and properly equipped enemy 
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with military training – especially Islamic terrorists trained in the mountains of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan – would have no problem striking out over those mountains 
and sneaking into the country.” To support his argument, Hayworth (2006:6) notes 
that in 2004 the southern Border Patrol arrested 650 “suspected” terrorists. Hayworth 
(2006:6) also quotes U.S. Admiral James Loy who revealed that U.S. intelligence 
suspects al Qaeda of intentions to cross the U.S.-Mexican border with a nuclear 
bomb.
All proponents of the above information, however, admit no conclusive
evidence exists that a terrorist attack will result from a crossing of the U.S.-Mexican 
border. This demonstrates the rhetorical nature of the conflation between immigration 
and terrorism. Yet, whether exaggerated or not, rhetoric has a way of influencing 
policy – not only policy change, but blind acceptance of policy, as well. James 
Davison Hunter (1991), Richard C. Leone (2003) and Alan Brinkley (2003) have all 
noted a “silent majority,” “a quiet Republic,” and “140 years of silence” with regard 
to public influence on U.S. policy. This silence results from a majority that resides 
comfortably between political extremes (Hunter 1991) and feels “in good hands” 
under the protection of the U.S. government (Leone 2003:21). As Leone (2003) 
argues, ambiguity of security has become commonplace as threats to U.S. security 
appeared to be coming from all directions after 9/11: Americans were told of anthrax 
attacks, terror camps in Afghanistan and Iraq, and weapons of mass destruction in 
North Korea and Iraq. In the wake of these threats, Leone (2003:15) wrote “most 
citizens can’t know how to rank-order the dangers or how to judge whether our 
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approach – heavy on military and law enforcement, light on debate and diplomacy –
is the most effective way to proceed.” Thus, “sweeping” changes in U.S. policy at 
home and abroad have happened with little public debate (Leone 2003:15). It is in 
this way that a study involving rhetoric for data is, in fact, legitimate. Rhetoric, by 
nature, is used for persuading people to accept and promote changes in policy. The 
rhetoric concerning immigration and terrorism has been especially prevalent since 
9/11; and, as always, current events on these issues determine which aspects of 
rhetoric will be more received by the public. Immigration reform and threats of 
terrorism have been big news lately, especially with the recent presidential elections. 
Rhetoric, however, is also constructed and the tone of the rhetoric surrounding 
immigration and terrorism is rendered from dominant perspectives that stand to lose 
from the occurrences of these phenomena. Whether because of rhetoric, current 
events or special interests, what is most clear is that policy related to immigration and 
terrorism has certainly changed in the U.S.
Today’s rhetoric and attempts at policy change in response to the supposed 
link between immigration and terrorism are misguided attempts at understanding the 
relations between these two phenomena. In Chapter Four, I note the similarities 
between historical U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-Mexican relations that have led to terrorism 
and immigration; and, unlike contemporary rhetoric and ideologies would explain 
them, I believe the individualization of motivations and events has become an 
antiquated way of understanding these international issues. These similarities may be 
accounted for by employing World Systems Theory (Frank 1967; Wolf 1982; Arrighi 
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2005; Sklair 2005), thereby recognizing the world is not composed of unrelated parts, 
but is rather a manifold of interconnected pieces that influence one another. 
The link between immigration and terrorism demonstrates this relation of 
parts. Though I review short term solutions to policy on both issues, I conclude that 
the major solution to these two issues is a fundamental change in how we have 
conceptually organized that world. Wolf (1982) suggested a paradigm shift in our 
individualized understanding of international conflict. The implications of this shift 
for immigration and terrorism policy would be that we consider broader causes of the 
phenomena. I propose, when shaping U.S. policy on immigration and terrorism, we 
ask if terrorists and immigrants have been victims of the interrelated phenomena of 
neoliberalism, structural violence and U.S. policy. If the goal in creating U.S. policy 
on terrorism and immigration (whether a threat or not) is to reduce their occurrences, 
then to appreciate the connections between these phenomena will create more 
constructive strategies to these goals and international policy and conflict in general. 
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Chapter 2: Identifying the Symptoms: The Roots of Terrorism
To unravel the aspects of neoliberal and U.S. policy that have caused
structural violence and contributed to terrorism, the first steps are to define terrorism 
and dispel commonly held assumptions about what makes a terrorist. Definitions of 
terrorism are especially difficult because terrorism is a concept, not a physical object
(Laqueur 1999; Schmid 1983). The U.S. Department of Defense (2008:552) defines 
terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit 
of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.” The U.S. Department of 
State (2001:4) adds that terrorism is “perpetrated against noncombatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents...” Thus, we see that Washington’s 
definitions find terrorism to be violence used by anti-state actors to coerce groups and 
governments into compliance with specific political, religious or ideological agendas. 
It is interesting to note, then, by these definitions that states are not capable of 
terrorism, even though many have argued the U.S.’s activity in the Middle East is 
state terrorism. These definitions also do not identify causes of terrorism, contributing 
to the idea that terrorism happens without provocation by the flippant will of 
individuals. Nasser (2005:18) writes that terrorism is “a political label [my emphasis] 
given to people who are perceived to be planning or carrying out acts of violence for 
political objectives.” The fact that Nasser finds the term terrorism to be a label, rather 
than an objective phenomenon, demonstrates the subjectivity of terrorism. 
Washington has been unable to accept this subjectivity because it would threaten the 
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philosophy of U.S. foreign policy. If “one man’s terrorist” really “is another man’s 
freedom fighter,” then the U.S. was involved in terror long before al Qaeda. 
As Nassar (2005:16) writes, “Terrorism is a symptom rather than a disease. It 
has other causes.” Groups like Palestinians who have been forced from their homes, 
denied their rights, “rendered refugees,” and victimized by the Israeli government 
have been labeled terrorists when they have fought back against their oppressors 
(Nasser 2005:18). And, interestingly, the state of Israel, which confiscated Palestinian
land, imposed restrictions on Palestinian life and subjected Palestinians to state-
initiated violence, is labeled a victim of terrorism. Clearly, as Nasser (2005:18) 
argues, “the label of terrorism…often leads to the disfiguring of genuine causes of 
liberation,” and it is certainly in the interests of oppressors to put the oppressed in the 
wrong. In my argument, recently, terrorism against the U.S. has happened due to the 
effects of neoliberal policy, transnational corporate activity and U.S. foreign policy 
that have exacerbated structural violence around the world. Those experiencing this 
violence respond with terror, “carry[ing] their struggle into the heartland of their 
oppressors” and “bringing nightmares to those who live there” (Nassar 2005:18). 
Yet, it should not be assumed that terrorism immediately follows the 
experience of neoliberalism, transnational corporate activity and U.S. foreign policy 
and structural violence. Another important aspect to the definition of terrorism is that 
terrorism is not born over night. Terrorism develops in response to a series of events 
that may have begun decades ago. Neoliberal economics, transnational corporate 
activity, structural violence and U.S. policy are simply the most recent pieces to the 
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puzzle of why the U.S. was attacked on 9/11. Later, the specific steps involving 
interactions between governments and people will be detailed to demonstrate how 
history, recent neoliberal adaptations and structural violence can inspire terror 
responses.
Now that the definition of terrorism has been laid, we may proceed to 
challenge myths surrounding terrorism. First are those myths surrounding why 
terrorist action emerges. One myth proposes that there is a terrorist psyche. The first 
aspect of this myth assumes that terrorists look and behave a certain way, and 
terrorists are products of unfortunate psychological backgrounds and are uneducated. 
In the case of al Qaeda, terrorists are assumed to have pathological personalities 
including narcissism, paranoia, and authoritarian personalities as a result of childhood 
or adolescent trauma (Sageman 2004:85-91). A second aspect of this myth is that 
terrorists come from disenfranchised backgrounds and are uneducated. Thus, 
terrorists blame and punish others for these misfortunes.
Most disturbing about the terrorist psyche idea is its similarities with early 
20th century phrenology (the study of physical attributes to determine personality) and 
its since deemed superficial uses to determine the “criminality” of an individual 
(Sageman 2004). Against this myth, Sageman finds these conventional explanations 
of terrorism “quick and comfortable,” as they barely scratch the surface of terrorism 
(Sageman 2004:80). On the topic of the terrorist psyche, Sageman (2004) has found 
evidence showing that individuals are not predisposed to join terrorist groups because 
of poor psychological backgrounds. In a study of 61 “terrorists” involved in al Qaeda, 
35
Sageman (2004:85-91) notes that none of his subjects suffered any serious childhood 
trauma as reported by friends, family and acquaintances, and that “there is no 
psychological profile for terrorism.” Similarly, on the topic of suicide terrorism, Pape 
argues that attacks are not waged by desperate psychopaths, but rather socially 
integrated persons (Pape 2005:23). 
The evidence against the second part of the terrorist psyche myth that 
terrorists are poverty-stricken and uneducated is also intriguing. In a study of 
American terrorist groups such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Weather 
Underground, and the Black Panthers, Hewitt (2002) finds the demographic of 
American leftist groups tended to be young, middle-to-upper-class, and well-educated 
individuals (Hewitt 2002:71). The same may be said of many members of 
revolutionary organizations around the world. For instance, Abimael Guzman, 
original leader beginning in the 1960s of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru 
was a professor at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. Guzman’s leadership 
encouraged several students of the school to join Shining Path’s revolution (Hewitt 
2002:250). Similarly, subcomandante Marcos, leader of the revolutionary Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation (EZLN), was a graduate of the Metropolitan 
Autonomous University (UAM). Marcos later received his master’s degree in 
philosophy at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), and, before 
joining the EZLN, he was a professor at UAM (Henck 2007). Given this information, 
it appears education is a key feature of revolutionary demographics. 
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These “terrorist” and revolutionary groups have demographic makeups that 
are quite similar to al Qaeda’s members today. Sageman’s (2004) study of 172 
members of the mujahedin (a Muslim guerilla military involved in a jihad) showed 
that, of the 102 individuals from which Sageman was able to get background 
information, “18 were upper class, 56 were middle class, and 28 were lower class” 
(Sageman 2005:73). Sageman also finds that most individuals in al Qaeda were 
professionals or “semi-skilled” employees such as police officers and mechanics 
(Sageman 2004:78). Osama bin Laden certainly fits this mold of the affluent and
educated individual. He is an heir to his family’s fortune and studied economics and 
business administration at King Abdulaziz University (Sageman 2004). Bin Laden’s 
accomplice, Ayman al-Zawahiri, also came from “one of the most prestigious 
Egyptian families in Cairo” and attended medical school before joining al Qaeda 
(Sageman 2004:26-34). Thus, as Sageman (2004:76) argues, these statistics 
“empirically refute the widespread notion that terrorism is a result of poverty and lack 
of education.”
Other myths surrounding why terrorism occurs are more ideological. Let us 
consider myths about why al Qaeda attacked the U.S. William Bennett (2002) and 
Paul Berman (2001) write that the U.S. was attacked because it is a liberal, modern 
nation that functions well. Berman echoes President Bush’s statements after 9/11 
when he argues that “America’s crime [to terrorists]…is to be America herself…to 
show that liberal society can thrive and that antiliberal society cannot” (Berman 
2001:4). Bennett makes a similar claim that the September 11th attacks were an 
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invitation to the U.S. “to finish” a war between good and evil: “When the advance 
troops of al-Qaeda set out to incinerate our innocent civilians, it was not any of our 
deeds but the very legitimacy of our existence that for them lay under question – and 
it was our existence that they were seeking, quite consciously, quite explicitly, to 
cancel” (Bennett 2002:45).  
Contrary to these myths about clashing ideologies, Pape (2005) argues it is 
foreign occupation that encourages terrorism. The U.S.’s occupation of the Middle 
East to protect its economic interests in oil has sparked suicide terrorism in particular 
– “a strategy for national liberation from foreign military occupation” (Pape 2005:45). 
Pape defines occupation as “the exertion of political control over territory by an 
outside group” (Pape 2005:83). Reactions to foreign occupation come in response to 
the changes in daily life due to foreign occupation. These changes have amounted to 
structural violence. For example, “the growth of Jewish settlements [on Palestinian 
land] not only consumed more land and water,” but required the “expansion” of the 
Israeli military in the Gaza strip, increasing violent encounters between Israelis and 
Palestinians and creating “more and more checkpoints,” making it difficult for 
Palestinians “to travel or carry out ordinary business” (Pape 2005:49). As stated in 
Chapter One, the effects of this structural violence facilitate the surrender of self-rule, 
as the political, economic and social power defining the interests and identity of the 
occupied peoples is lost to the occupiers (Pape 2005:84). 
This loss helps explain Sageman’s (2006) point that anyone, despite 
socioeconomic or political status, can be motivated to terrorize. This is so because of 
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the collective experience of structural violence. For instance, the Shining Path began 
at the University in Ayacucho, an impoverished and “isolated” town in rural Peru 
(Hewitt 2002:250). The population of Ayacucho suffered from extremely 
underdeveloped infrastructure, lack of communication means, restricted access to the 
outside world, and scarcity of water and arable land (Hewitt 2002:254). In 1959, the 
University of Huamanga reopened in Ayacucho with a mission for economic and 
social change; and by 1968, a Marxist orientation overtook the activities of the 
university under the leadership of Professor Guzman. Soon, the institution was ruled 
by Marxist principles (Hewitt 2002:255). Hewitt (2002:261) states, due to this 
collective experience and his contact with poverty through interactions with his own 
students, Guzman was motivated towards revolutionary action.
Bin Laden is also motivated to act revolutionarily by the collective experience 
of structural violence. Pape (2005) discusses bin Laden’s personal motivations for 
attacking the U.S. and agrees that bin Laden loathes the U.S. for its abandonment of 
Afghanistan after its win over the Soviet Union in 1988. However, Pape (2005) also 
states these motivations are not what bin Laden has used to encourage the public to 
support him. To gain public support, bin Laden has relied on public outrage at the 
inconveniences and structural violence caused by foreign economic and military 
policy in the Middle East. These policies, he states, have caused “severe oppression, 
suffering, excessive inequity, humiliation and poverty” (bin Laden qtd. in Pape 
2005:54). Thus, Bin Laden himself may not be experiencing the full extent of the 
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effects of the U.S. occupation in the Middle East, but he certainly demonstrates his 
devotion and solidarity to the struggle against this oppression.
Hewitt (2002) also argues that the motivation to resort to terrorist tactics 
comes from an overwhelming sense of non-violent protests achieving little success. In 
many cases, individuals who join terrorist groups recount having been members of 
non-violent, revolutionary groups whose demands were ignored and unrecognized by 
their governments (Hewitt 2002:23). Thus, revolutionary groups are more easily 
recruited to violent activity when their hopes have been dashed and their governments 
have failed or refuse to address their problems, resulting in their marginalization 
(Hewitt 2002:48). Thus, it is likely that legal action has been tried, and, beyond 
dissolving as a group or emigrating from the country, terrorism becomes one method 
to gain recognition and change from governments (Hewitt 2002). 
There is also a religious component to the collectivist argument on which 
Streusand (1997) elaborates. Islamic groups feel threatened by foreign occupation 
because Islam purports that everything outside of Islam, Dar al-Harb, is chaotic while 
everything within the realm of Islam, Dar al-Islam, is peaceful and good. Thus, the
U.S.’s occupation of the Middle East is a Dar al-Harb invasion of Dar al-Islam and 
calls for defense. Sageman (2004) also states that, as a result of alienation from 
society, disenfranchised individuals seek their roots to help them cope with their 
oppression. Simultaneously, the privatization of social services in the Middle East as 
a result of neoliberalism and structural violence has left much care giving and 
assistance in the hands of religious groups. Islam, being a major Middle Eastern 
40
religion, has helped to fill this void. This explains why terrorism, these days, has 
predominately Islamic overtones in American rhetoric. The circumstances of 
marginalization in the Middle East have given rise to Islam as common ground for 
oppressed peoples. Supporters of political Islam also state that Islamic movements 
such as those of Hezbollah and al Qaeda have succeeded where Arab nationalism, 
communism, socialism and democracy have failed the people of the Middle East 
(Stackman 2006). Thus, in many ways, Islam has become a venue for hopes and 
dreams. The result of this common ground is that revolutionary organizations and 
disenfranchised communities come to support one another. This mutual support lends 
strength to revolutionary groups such as al Qaeda and allows for a chance at terrorist 
revolutionary success (Hewitt 2002:45).
In the case of the U.S., because religious and cultural differences have been 
matched with an unwanted and inconvenient U.S. foreign occupation of the Middle 
East, we see that al Qaeda has attacked the United States. Similarly, Hamas has 
targeted Israel because it has troops occupying Palestine. However, Hamas has not 
attacked the U.S. outside of Israel or Palestine (even though Hamas detests U.S. 
support for Israel) because the U.S. has not deployed troops to those places. In the 
same way, because Israel is not currently occupying Iraq or Afghanistan, al Qaeda 
has not targeted Israel, even though al Qaeda claims Israel is also to blame for U.S. 
occupation of the Middle East (Pape 2005:47). Plainly stated, “neither group [Hamas 
nor al Qaeda] actually expends significant effort to attack opponents who do not have 
troops occupying their [religious] homeland” (Pape 2005:47). This may be due in part 
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to terrorist organizations having limited resources and, therefore, needing to be highly 
selective in and symbolic about whom they attack. However, I also argue in the next 
few pages that the U.S. occupation of the Middle East to fulfill its economic needs 
has made the U.S. a structural violence “institutionalizer” in the Middle East; and for 
that, the U.S. has been attacked.
Another myth is that terrorists are “brainwashed” by religious fundamentalism 
to hate the West and everything for which it stands. This myth was born as 
discussions of Islamic jihad, or holy war, erupted after 9/11. Yet, it appears what is 
most known about jihad is that Islam rewards martyrdom to Muslims who die for 
specific causes. Thus, it is believed that the majority of terrorists in al Qaeda, being 
“brainwashed” to envy the West, are ‘tickled’ with the idea of eternal glory by dying 
for Islam (Pape 2005:15,23). 
Further analysis of the history of jihad explains why Muslims in the Middle 
East feel particularly threatened by the West. The history of this jihad is related to the 
emergence of Salafism, a movement that believes Islam has strayed from its 
“righteous path” (Sageman 2004:4). To return to righteousness, the practice of Islam 
must become as it was in the days of the prophet Mohammed and his followers 
(Sageman 2004:4). After decolonization of the Middle East and the resulting 
repression by the new and modern states, some Salafists began to believe that a jihad 
was necessary to convert the practice of Islam back to more honorable times 
(Sageman 2004:7). Sayyid Qutb emerged as a central figure of this philosophy and 
called for a jihad to found the Muslim holy state, asserting the jihad was to be violent 
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and waged upon all “nominally Muslim regimes” (Sageman 2004:14). In 1966, in 
response to his revolutionary message, Nasser arrested Qtub and executed him. But, 
contrary to Nasser’s plan, Qtub’s execution made him a martyr in the eyes of his 
followers and his message was disseminated among Muslims (Sageman 2004:14). 
Despite the spread of Qtub’s word, it does not appear that religious 
brainwashing has taken shape in Middle Eastern terrorism. Sageman states that of his 
sample of 137 terrorists, only 17 percent had been educated in the Islamic Salafi 
tradition (Sageman 2004:74). Sageman also found that individuals came to al Qaeda 
on their own accord rather than by recruitment. Furthermore, individuals are accepted 
into al Qaeda only after careful evaluation. They are not taken in as if by cattle call 
(Sageman 2004:122). This information is evidence that there is a strategic logic to 
terrorism and the phenomenon should not be relegated to mere issues of idiosyncrasy 
(Pape 2005). Moreover, while Pape (2005:15) asserts that suicide terrorism has some 
religious components, it is not fixed solely to Islam. Interestingly, Pape notes that of 
315 recorded suicide attacks around the world, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka – a 
secularist, Marxist-Leninist group – are the “leading instigators of suicide attacks,” 
having “committed 76 of the 315 incidents, more suicide attacks than Hamas” (Pape 
2005:4). 
The last myth about terrorism appears prevalent in U.S. strategies to defeat 
terrorism: it is the belief that terrorist groups are hierarchically organized with one 
leader. For instance, to break down Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”), a leftist 
terrorist group in Peru, Peruvian authorities hunted down leader Abimael Guzman 
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and executed him. Shortly thereafter, Sendero Luminoso collapsed (Palmer 
1995:303). This strategy succeeded because Sendero Luminoso was completely 
dependent on one leader. Likewise, after the September 11th attacks, President Bush 
launched an international manhunt for Osama bin Laden; however, though Bush’s 
campaign has succeeded in destroying terrorist camps, bin Laden is as elusive as ever 
and al Qaeda remains active. 
Sageman (2004) recognizes that the charge to stop terrorism must begin with 
recognition that al Qaeda is not hierarchical and requires more involved methods of 
dismantling. Al Qaeda is a multi-national entity with heterogeneous ethnic groupings 
that does not hold to any particular state or act as a cohesive entity. The organization 
of al Qaeda is more of a coalition of jihads of the Maghreb Arabs, the Core Arabs, the 
Southeast Asians, and the Central Staff (Sageman 2004:139). These groups are 
composed of clusters, made up of individual cells and built around terror hubs 
(Sageman 2004:137). The clusters resemble “small-world[s],” where power is 
decentralized and groups are able to exist and act without instruction passed down 
from above (Sageman 2004:139). Each small world, then, has a certain amount of 
autonomy and may act, quite effectively, without direction from any one central 
leader. This globalized and decentralized nature of al Qaeda makes it a difficult 
organization to fight by conventional methods and, thus, more preventive measures 
must be taken to defeat al Qaeda. 
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Neoliberalism, Transnational Corporations, U.S. Policy, Structural Violence, 
and the Steps to Terrorism
In the examples above, the concept of structural violence is particularly useful 
in understanding the eventual turn to terrorism. As noted by Pape (2005), Israel’s 
expansion into Palestine has caused several hardships for Palestinians and has fueled 
the growth of the Palestinian terror organization, Hamas, as an answer to this 
oppression. Similarly, the causes of terrorist attacks from the Arab world on the U.S. 
may be characterized as responses to the international structural violence exacerbated 
by neoliberalism, transnational corporate activity and by the U.S. via its foreign 
policy in the Middle East (Nassar 2005). These policies have poured resources in the 
forms of money, arms and troops into the support of regimes in exchange for their 
ensuring political stability and the security of U.S. interests in oil. Yet, states that
have complied with these arrangements have had to cut governmental programs and 
social services for the public to do so, such as affordable healthcare and housing, 
unemployment, higher education and subsidized food and utilities. Thus, when 
regimes or Middle Easterners in general have been uncooperative with these 
requisites, the U.S. has intervened militarily. This is true for the U.S.’s most recent 
war in Iraq and it has also been the case for the U.S.’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. 
So what has been the public reaction in the Middle East to these policies? As 
Nassar (2005:35) states, because these policies tend to frustrate “certain basic wishes, 
needs, or instincts,” individuals may react with violent aggression. Gurr (1970) 
describes this experience of structural violence as a feeling of “relative deprivation:” 
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the larger the gap in the lives of the disenfranchised between what one has and what 
one believes he/she should have, the more likely violence will result in response. Gurr 
(1986) also finds that as empires adopt more forceful and violent tactics to address 
objectors of disenfranchisement, it is more likely their violence will be met with 
violence. As Bourdieu (1998:40) writes, the “law of the conservation of violence” can 
not be cheated: “all violence is paid for.” Physical violence and structural violence “in 
the form of layoffs, loss of security, etc., is matched sooner or later in the form of 
suicides, crime and delinquency, drug addiction, alcoholism, a whole host of minor 
and major everyday acts of violence” (Bourdieu 1998:40). Since the U.S. deployed 
troops to Iraq in 2003, we have seen these same reactions from the Iraqi people in 
response to the U.S.’s presence.  
How, then, do these assertions apply to the terrorists of September 11th? 
Juergensmeyer (2006:78) argues that al Qaeda’s terrorism can actually be described 
as “guerrilla anti-globalis[m].” Some have argued that neoliberal globalization is a 
preventive tool against terrorism because it sparks development in nations that suffer 
from oppression and poverty. In contrast, LaFeber (2002) argues that these 
individuals have not considered the limits of globalization – limits that have widened 
the gap between the rich and poor in underdeveloped countries. Neoliberal
globalization “could produce wealth, but it…[does] not necessarily distribute it more 
equitably or with the necessary intelligence” (LaFeber 2002:11). Too often, in places 
like Latin America, high economic growth rates have been taken for economic 
stability and when the woes of the disenfranchised are not addressed because of these 
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misconceptions, violence and revolution are born (LaFeber 2002). Thus, neoliberal
globalization is not equipped to resolve issues of extreme poverty in places where 
terrorism has developed: if anything it heightens these dire circumstances. 
LaFeber’s assertions fit well with analysis of Saudi Arabia’s economic 
history. Considering that 15 of the 19 highjackers involved in the 9/11 attacks were 
Saudi Arabian, an investigation of U.S. economic policy and influence on Saudi 
Arabia due to its interests in oil would be instructive. Historically, reasons for the 
U.S.’s interest in the Middle East have been many. U.S. dependency on oil, especially 
in its relationship with Saudi Arabia, is the most obvious. As Rachel Bronson 
(2005:374) argues, “to understand the long-standing U.S.-Saudi relationship, more 
attention must be given to the political environment in which oil was needed and its 
profits employed.” On the U.S. end of the relationship, Paul Aarts (2005:408) states 
“the United States accounts for one fifth of the world oil consumption” while Saudi 
Arabia is “the world’s largest oil exporter.” The U.S. Department of State (2008:5) 
also observes that in Saudi Arabia, “Oil accounts for more than 90% of the country’s
exports and nearly 75% of government revenues.” 
The above statistics result from what has historically been known as a 
“special” relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia – one in which the U.S. 
provided protection for Saudi Arabia in exchange for rights to oil production and 
cheaper oil prices. This began in 1933 when Saudi Arabia granted the California 
Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC), or the Arabian American Oil Company 
(Aramco) now, an oil exploration concession, which proved fruitful in 1938 when 
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substantial oil reserves were discovered in eastern Saudi Arabia. From then on, the 
U.S. sought to manage and defend oil production in Saudi Arabia. However, this 
relationship had several consequences for Saudi Arabia during its oil boom of the 
1970s and its oil bust of the 1980s. During the boom, Saudi Arabia experienced such 
prosperity that the government was able to liberalize its policies, significantly cutting 
back taxes and downsizing government bureaucracy while still providing ample 
social services for Saudi Arabia’s growing population (Chaundry 1997). 
This fairytale, however, came to an end during Saudi Arabia’s oil bust. 
Because private funding of public services had been so minimized and the U.S. 
government had ceased providing economic aid to Saudi Arabia during the boom, the 
Saudi government had no alternatives for the growing public when oil prices 
declined. Thus, social programs and services were cut to keep the economy afloat. 
Meanwhile, despite Saudi Arabia’s economic place at the time, the U.S.’s per capita 
income was growing. To no avail, the Saudi public eventually demanded reforms of 
Saudi policy and its oil relationship with the U.S. to right these wrongs. Saudi leaders 
were unresponsive, and, when public discontent had reached its peak, especially with 
war in the neighboring Yemen, the U.S. deployed troops to Saudi Arabia in 1991 to 
protect its oil interests and settle these domestic issues, thereby setting the stage for 
September 11.
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The Oil for Security Relationship:
Aarts (2005:404 ) writes that the U.S.-Saudi Arabia oil-for-security 
relationship dates back to a formal pledge of security by Franklin Roosevelt to Ibn 
Sa’ud of Saudi Arabia in 1945, where, until 2001, the U.S. 
guaranteed protection from external threats and favourable trading terms, 
while Saudi Arabia committed itself to producing sufficient oil at reasonable 
prices, and ‘recycled a significant portion of its oil income through the 
economies and banks of the developed world (prominently including the 
U.S.).’
This relationship was beneficial to the U.S., especially during the Cold War. Bronson 
(2005) states that the U.S. used Saudi Arabian oil to help with the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II. Then, as American oil production declined and demand 
rose, the U.S. became increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabian oil. It was here, in the 
mid 1940’s, that the U.S.’s watchful eye over issues in the Middle East became 
especially important for Saudi Arabia. As Aarts (2005:427) states, “radical domestic 
political [and economic] changes in oil-producing countries often lead to suppressed 
output…Substantially higher prices [of oil] would be the inevitable consequence, 
with concomitant effects on the global and US economies.” 
This is not to say that the U.S. is solely responsible for the rise of public 
dissent in Saudi Arabia. As stated above, a number of worldwide phenomena 
contributed to this development, including the economic trends prior to the 1980’s, 
such as laissez faire economics, leading up to neoliberalism and the contributions of 
transnational corporate policies. However, U.S. policy during this time certainly 
contributed to the unfolding of neoliberal economics and politics and added to the 
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structural violence in the future Middle East. U.S. foreign policy held that political, 
economic and military interventions were necessary to protect its interests in the 
Middle East. Originally, these interventions happened by “‘off-shore’ balancing,” 
whereby “U.S. administrations from Harry Truman’s to Ronald Reagan’s used 
foreign assistance to build strong alliances with key local states [in the Middle East], 
while developing the capability to rapidly deploy American combat forces into the 
region should a crisis emerge” (Pape 2005:249). The U.S. government and Saudi 
Arabia’s “oil monarchy” also maintained a relationship in which the U.S. provided 
aid in exchange for the monarchy’s maintenance of domestic stability in Saudi Arabia 
(Jones 2003:43). Prados (2006:18) writes that from 1946-1975, the U.S. supplied 
Saudi Arabia with $328.4 million in aid, “of which $295.8 million was military and 
$32.6 million was economic assistance” to curb political uprisings and economic 
crises. The U.S. also became the primary arms provider for Saudi Arabia, having 
delivered $22.9 billion worth of arms to the country prior to 1997 (Prados 2006). 
These arms and aid helped suppress political opposition and sustain stability within
Saudi Arabia, which translated to economic growth for the U.S. (Pape 2005). 
In this way, U.S. policy supported the Saudi throne to protect U.S. oil 
interests. For example, in 1960, when King Saud began threatening that he would 
nationalize Aramco if the U.S. would not share its oil profits 50/50 with Saudi Arabia 
and when director of financial affairs Abdullah Tariki enlisted Saudi Arabia in OPEC, 
the U.S. quickly acted, ousting Saud and Tariki from office and replacing each 
respectively with King Faisal and al-Yamani (Stork 1980). When asked to comment 
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on these maneuvers, President Kennedy responded that the U.S.’s economic well-
being depended on the “firm and wise leadership” of King Faisal (Stork 1980:25). Al-
Yamani was credited with leading the opposition to nationalizing the oil industry and, 
in 1962, Faisal implemented reforms that would eventually overturn sanctions on 
trade and investment in Saudi Arabia that restricted foreign ownership of industries to 
49 percent and prohibited foreign ownership of land for industry and housing 
employees (Malik and Niblock 2005:88).
Faisal’s reforms emphasized economic development and invited foreign 
investment in Saudi Arabia (Stork 1980). His plans were carried out by subsequent 
leaders of Saudi Arabia as well, including King Khalid in 1975, King Fahd in 1982, 
and King Abdallah in 2005. These plans were neoliberal in nature and improved 
market infrastructure, extending paved highways, providing electricity and increasing 
the number of Saudi Arabian seaports. Then, in 1985, reforms were made to open 
Saudi Arabia to foreign investment so that 70-80 percent of industries in the country 
were jointly owned by both Saudi and foreign interests. Finally, the Saudi 
government accomplished its most liberal reforms in 2000 when it joined the WTO 
(U.S. Department of State 2008). New legislation was passed allowing for complete 
ownership of companies in Saudi Arabia by foreign investors (Malik and Niblock 
2005:88). In effect, Saudi Arabia lifted restrictions “on foreign investment in oil 
exploration and production, trade, and land and air transportation” (Malik and 
Niblock 2005:94). Today, emphasis on privatizing Saudi Arabia’s industries remains 
a chief goal.
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But how have these economic and political policies of the U.S-Saudi 
relationship affected the Saudi public? Though several authors have hinted at 
domestic dissent and anti-American sentiment within Saudi borders, few have 
provided specific details of these instances. Paul Aarts’s (2005:403) take on this 
matter is especially noteworthy:
What certainly has changed is the deepening animosity of both the US and the 
Saudi public – …clearly showing that the relationship [between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia] has never relied on a broad-based public support on either side 
of the partnership. In effect, it always has been an elite bargain...
Furthermore, “the formulation of policy and response to policy in the early phase of 
the recession [Saudi Arabia’s oil bust] was confined to business, bureaucratic, and 
tribal elites” (Chaundry 1997:293). In effect, as the Saudi oil and economic crises 
developed, even as the Saudi public demanded reform of domestic policy, Saudi elites 
protested the reintroduction of public taxation to address these social woes (Chaundry 
1997). Thus, as Aarts (2005) states, clearly the interests of the majority of Saudis 
were not taken into account in U.S.-Saudi policy making.
To illustrate the public experience of Saudi policy, a discussion of Saudi 
Arabia’s oil economy is in order. The oil price boom of the 1970s drastically altered 
domestic policy and the Saudi Arabian state as an institution. From 1973 to 1983, 
Chaundry (1997) states oil was so profitable for Saudi Arabia that taxation became 
relatively unnecessary. King Khalid’s government was able to fund state-wide public 
services such as the General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI), so private 
corporations were no longer required to make social security payments (Chaundry 
1997). The second oil price boom of 1979 allowed for more welfare programs for 
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“the handicapped, abandoned women, and illegitimate children” and social security 
benefits packages were improved (Chaundry 1997:149). Chaundry (1997) argues, 
however, that this “end” of taxation led to a decrease in the bureaucracy of 
“extraction” from Saudi Arabian society; and this bureaucratic decline had severe 
consequences when its oil boom became a bust in 1984. Essentially, as Niblock 
(2007:51) states, though the goal of the liberalization of the Saudi state was 
development, Saudi Arabia’s period of oil profiteering
should, however, be thought of as a transitional stage, where the economy was 
being taken in a new direction with a vision of substantive change, but where 
the resources, availability of trained Saudi personnel and infrastructure were 
insufficient to bring about a major social or economic transformation.
In 1986, the U.S. Department of State (2008:5) reports that 
higher oil prices led to development of more oil fields around the world and 
reduced global consumption. The result…was a worldwide oil glut, which 
introduced an element of planning uncertainty for the first time in a decade. 
Saudi oil production, which had increased to almost 10 million barrels per day 
(b/d) during 1980-81, dropped to about 2 million b/d in 1985. Budgetary 
deficits developed, and the government drew down its foreign assets.
At the insistence of the IMF and the U.S., Saudi Arabia decreased its production so 
that prices would not dip below $30 per barrel to curb the oil price crisis and avoid 
crippling the wealth of transnational corporations (Schaeffer 2005:49). However, 
other oil-producing countries, especially those in OPEC in need of oil profits, did not 
follow Saudi Arabia’s lead and continued producing beyond their oil quotas. As a 
result, Saudi Arabia saw their oil revenues “decline from $119 billion in 1981 to only 
$26 billion in 1985” (Schaeffer 2005:49). In response, Saudi Arabia abandoned its 
position as “swing producer” of oil in the Middle East and soon increased production. 
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Oil prices, then, plunged to $10 a barrel, bringing the Saudi Arabia’s oil crisis into 
full effect. Saudi Arabia’s high oil profits would not return either, as, in the 1990s, the 
country’s profits fell by 40% and the government “ran a $13 billion budget deficit in 
1999” (Schaeffer 2005:168). To rebound, as a main supplier of funding to the IMF 
and the World Bank, Saudi Arabia followed advisories from each institution on how
to recover from its oil crisis. Each emphasized structural adjustment and development 
(Niblock 2007). This set the stage for the liberalization of the Saudi economy which 
would antagonize structural violence within the country.
Saudi Arabia’s experience of its oil bust was also exacerbated by its 
relationship with the U.S. Toby Jones (2003:43) finds that in 1981, the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabian average per capita incomes were both around $18,000. However, by 
2003, the U.S. average per capita income had grown to $36,000 while the Saudi per 
capita income had fallen to $7,500 and unemployment rates had risen to about 25 
percent. This was coupled with an exhaustion of Saudi funds due to its funding of the 
U.S.’s first Gulf War; and, in the years to come, military spending would continue to 
increase “at an annual rate of $18 billion per annum for the period 1990 to 2002” 
(Sager 2005:238). 
The above numbers demonstrate that the liberalization of Saudi economic and 
social policy and the Saudi relationship with the U.S. made the country weak during 
its oil bust. By the time the oil crises developed, Chaundry (1997:294) states “the 
organizations and institutions that had protected domestic populations from price 
fluctuation, foreign exchange uncertainty, and scarcities during the rapid 
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internationalization of the 1970s – [essentially] the government in Saudi Arabia…–
had become dysfunctional.” In this way, ironically, structural violence had been 
institutionalized at the height of Saudi Arabia’s economy.
As its oil bust worsened, structural violence in Saudi Arabia amounted to 
extreme budget cuts in areas of social services, healthcare, affordable housing and 
funding for infrastructure to help repay the Saudi debt. The Saudi public felt this 
violence as welfare programs in the form of “state-sector employment, higher 
education, and subsidized food, housing and utilities” were all scrapped (Chaundry 
1997:295). Several factories declared bankruptcy, and, according to Saleh al-Toaimi, 
secretary general of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, 
“the number of merchants, retailers, commission-holders, agents and industrialists in 
Riyadh declined by 80 percent in the mid-1980s” (qtd. in Chaundry 1997:273). 
Finally, Sager (2005) notes despite these conditions, Saudi Arabia’s population 
continued to grow and a surplus of youths, educated and uneducated alike, composing 
about 55 percent of the Saudi population, fell victim to unemployment. 
The oil crises contributed to an eruption of political instability in Saudi Arabia 
and the surrounding area, and, eventually, physical violence became the means by 
which the Saudi government maintained domestic control. Political dissent began on 
a small scale. Meijer (2005:274) states it began with petitions by “businessmen and 
intellectuals” for more open and democratic government. Protestors were also 
angered at Saudi Arabia’s dependence on foreign troops for protection, a fact that 
made Saudi Arabia appear malleable to the demands of its protectors, mainly the 
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United States. Yet, the Saudis also wanted a government that could maintain the state 
as a useful institution for the people. The drop in oil prices paired with the 
liberalization of the Saudi government had made the state weak; and, as Sager 
(2005:247) declares, what Saudis demanded was nothing less than the construction of 
institutional pillars for the edifice of the Saudi state
to be supported and cemented by the principles of equal citizenship for all, the 
rule of law, respect for human rights, social justice and modern institutions 
capable of riding the globalisation wave with confidence.
Unfortunately, Meijer (2005) states these protests were not taken seriously; and it was 
not until radical and, at times, religious, groups began to protest that the Saudi 
government felt particularly threatened. These groups demanded Saudi Arabia build 
up its own military to become independent of the U.S. They also accused the Saudi 
monarchy of “nepotism, corruption and moral decadence” (Meijer 2005:275). Groups 
also encouraged disloyalty among Saudi citizens if the government did not submit to 
these demands or abide by shari’a law.
Initially, King Fahd responded by arresting signers of these petitions and those 
who were publicly contentious (Meijer 2005). In turn, Islamist opposition mounted in 
frustration with the Saudi government and pushed for more action-based political 
discussion and reforms of Saudi Arabia. Eventually, the monarchy opted for all out 
repression. For example, members of the Committee for Defence of Legitimate 
Rights (CDLR), a human rights organization in Saudi Arabia, were forced to flee the 
country or spend life in jail for raising Western support for a democratic Saudi Arabia
(Meijer 2005:276). Two of the CDLR’s members actually chose the latter option, yet, 
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eventually the Saudi government succeeded in quieting their protests. The Saudi 
government was also forced to crush subversive activity such as “terrorist car 
bombings in the capital of Riyadh and running gun battles in Mecca and Medina” 
(Jones 2003:43). These military endeavors actually amounted to use of 40 percent of 
the Saudi budget, exacerbating the poor Saudi economy while it suffered from its oil 
bust and subsidized the U.S.’s first Gulf War (Jones 2003:43). 
The Gulf War, U.S. Occupation of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Repression
Because oil is and has been the “lifeblood” of the U.S. economy – supplying 
“more than 40% of our total energy demands and more than 99%” of our automotive 
fuels – the U.S. was alarmed at Iraq’s nationalization of its oil fields in 1972 (U.S. 
Department of Energy 2008). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, taking 
over 19 percent of the world’s oil, the U.S. could finally begun collecting reasons to 
invade Iraq (Bronson 2005). It was argued Iraq’s invasion could have threatened the 
U.S.’s oil relationship with Saudi Arabia. In response, the U.S. immediately stationed 
troops in Saudi Arabia to “protect” the country and its resources from the Iraqi threat 
(Bronson 2005). When Hussein’s forces retreated from Kuwait, the U.S. pulled its 
troops out of Saudi Arabia; but, in 1994, Iraqi forces threatened Kuwait again. The 
U.S. came to aid Kuwait, stationing 36,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. As a result, 
domestic tension mounted from the buildup of American troops within Saudi borders 
to counter Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait (Bronson 2005). Bronson 
(2005:386) also states from this point on, American troops in Saudi Arabia only 
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increased, contributing to “domestic dissent,” Saudi restrictions on U.S. military
action, and lack of support of Saudi citizens for U.S. operations against Iraq. 
As Chaundry (1997) and Meijer (2005) argue, it is here that religious 
fundamentalism and extremism became the beacons for those less fortunate of Saudi 
Arabia. According to Chaundry (1997), many of these movements could be 
characterized as the expression of fear and uncertainty about Saudi Arabia’s 
economic future. Suddenly, the “language of identity and morality” were used to 
“reconstitute the borders of economic community” in Saudi Arabia (Chaundry 
1997:294). Furthermore, as Gurr (1986) would argue and Chaundry (2005) and 
Meijer (2005) demonstrate, Saudi state repression of political dissent eventually led to 
violent movements. At one point, King Fahd created a consultative council and the 
1992 Basic Law to allow for public influence on government policy and the creation 
of a Saudi Arabian bill of rights (Jones 2003:44). Yet, Jones (2003:44) says, despite 
these reforms, Fahd used these reforms to “centralize” the oil monarchy’s power and 
make public access to politics more difficult. 
As a result, attacks on the Saudi government and symbols of U.S. influence 
increased. For instance, there was a bomb attack in November of 1995 on an 
American building in Riyadh that killed seven people, five of them Americans. In this 
particular instance, three Salafi Jihad organizations took responsibility, each making 
similar claims that more attacks would ensue if the U.S. did not cease its influence on 
Saudi affairs. In 1996, the American Khobar Towers in Dhahran were attacked. Then, 
after Saudi Arabia had made the final neoliberal reforms to join the WTO in April of 
58
2000, the stage was set for structural violence against the Saudi public to increase
because more state-wide protections had been removed. Thus, Saudi discontent had 
reached a new level when 9/11 happened. The “external” and hidden enemy of the 
Middle East, the U.S. – an enforcer of globalization and neoliberalism – was finally 
attacked on its own territory (Meijer 2005:277).
In sum, as Nassar (2005:34) argues, the September 11th attacks were in 
response to American economic and military expansion in the world and the resulting 
economic disparities resulting from this empire. Furthermore, Nassar (2005:34) 
argues that even after 9/11, American expansion continued: 
the main goals of the war against Iraq had nothing to do with weapons of mass 
destruction or democratizing Iraq but rather with controlling 10 percent of the 
world’s oil reserves and fulfilling a regime change against a dictator who no 
longer played ball with American interests and demands.
Gurr would argue that the “relative deprivation” felt by Saudi Arabians as their 
government continued to serve U.S. oil interests contributed to frustrations with the 
Saudi monarchy. Gurr (1986), Hewitt (2002) and Sageman (2004), then, continue that 
because Saudi citizen attempts at reform by legal means were met with more 
government corruption and violence, Saudis turned to their own methods of change. 
These violent methods were met with extreme military power, and as the Saudi 
government grew more actively suspicious about the Saudi public, Saudi Arabians 
bonded through Islam and their shared experience of economic, political and military 
oppression (Gurr 1986; Sageman 2004). The last step in the equation was Saudi 
recognition of the global influences on their local experiences. As Jones argues, a 
“deep fear that external forces threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the country 
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ha[d] taken root, particularly as the U.S. expand[ed] its military efforts globally” 
(Jones 2003). Consequently, members of al Qaeda took note of this, sympathizing 
with the disaffected of Saudi Arabia and fighting their enemy directly on September 
11th. 
Solutions for U.S. Policy on Terrorism:
Terrorism against the U.S. will end when the U.S. reduces its contributions to 
the circumstances which lead law-abiding peoples to illegal terrorist methods. Pape 
(2005) and Nassar (2005) propose the first step: U.S. forces leave Iraq since 
occupation is what leads groups to feel threatened. Pape and Nassar also agree that 
democracy may be an effective governmental form for the Middle East, but public 
enthusiasm for democracy is vital to its institutionalization. Democracy can not be 
enforced by the barrel of a gun; it must grow from within (Pape 2005; Nassar 2005). 
Pape also stresses reducing our economic interests in the Middle East, so that Middle 
Eastern political strife does not directly affect our interests. Here, Pape is specifically 
referring to U.S. dependence on oil. By becoming energy independent, the U.S. will 
not only be self-sufficient, but it will also stop economically supporting the very 
insurgent activity it is fighting in the Middle East (Pape 2005:249).
Long term solutions to U.S. policy on terrorism will be discussed in Chapter 
Four, emphasizing the connectedness among worldwide phenomena and using World 
Systems Theory as elaborated by Arrighi (2005) and Sklair (2005) to explain these 
connections. For now, however, the Saudi Arabia example shows that terrorist threats 
on the U.S. today arise out of recognition of global expansion and economic policy 
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influencing local lives. Individuals become infuriated at their government’s inability 
or unwillingness to “stand up” to global powers, such as neoliberal economics and the 
U.S., that have caused extreme structural violence and social and economic disparities 
(Bourdieu 1998:20). These groups, then, organize to fight what they perceive to be 
the source of their problems; and the U.S., being an enforcer of neoliberal policy in 
the Middle East, becomes their target. In this way, a more constructive view of 
terrorism is that it is “a political label” given to those “planning or carrying out acts of 
violence for political objectives” (Nassar 2005:17). What is encouraging about this 
perspective is that, unlike the stifling concept of a “terrorist,” governments and 
political groups are accessible. They may be negotiated with, and knowledge of what 
turns them to violence will help prevent the adoption of terrorism to fight their
causes. 
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Chapter 3: The Story of Migration
Thus far, I have discussed how U.S. participation in the enforcement of 
neoliberal economic policies in foreign countries has produced structural violence and 
the conditions for terrorist action against this oppression. Now, I will elaborate on 
how the U.S.’s enforcement of neoliberal economic policy has induced structural 
violence and prompted immigration to the U.S. As in the case of terrorism, there 
seem to be misunderstandings as to the full story behind immigration. For example, 
consider the public reaction to statements made by Senator Barack Obama on 
Sunday, April 6, 2008, during a presidential campaign speech in San Francisco. 
Obama commented on the effects the recession is having on Americans, specifically 
small town people:
You go into some of these small towns in Pennsylvania, and like a lot of small 
towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for 25 years and nothing’s 
replaced them. And they fell through the Clinton administration, and the Bush 
administration, and each successive administration has said that somehow 
these communities are gonna regenerate and they have not. So it’s not 
surprising then that they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy 
to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade 
sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations (qtd. in Carrigan 2008:1).
Obama’s remarks made headlines and letters to the editor in many newspapers 
read “I’m not bitter!” A few days later, Obama admitted his word choice was unwise, 
but he would not renege on the substance of his statement. Obama’s statement brings 
to the forefront important questions about the root of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanics make up about one-sixth (42.7 
million) of the country’s 296.4 million people. Furthermore, from 2004 to 2005, the 
U.S. population grew by 2.8 million people, with Hispanics comprising about half or 
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1.3 million of that total. While 800,000 of the 1.3 million are attributed to natural 
increase (birth minus death), 500,000 are attributed to immigration (Bernstein 
2006:1). Given these statistics, controversy over migrants from the South taking 
American jobs, seems grounded. It is logical to observe an influx of migrants, a 
decrease in employment opportunities due to the economy and assume that jobs and 
wealth are being snatched up by immigrants of the largest and the fastest growing 
minority group in the U.S. (Bernstein 2006:1). Animosity towards these groups is 
also heightened by the idea that even those Americans with jobs have no job security: 
individuals may lose their jobs any day to migrant workers willing to work for less. 
This overall fear of losing one’s job is summed up by Thomas Friedman’s 
observation that “When you lose your job, the unemployment rate is not 5.2 percent; 
it’s 100 percent” (2005:226). 
However, the extent to which these jobs are lost and being “taken” by 
immigrant workers should be questioned. On the U.S. side of the U.S.-Mexican 
border, for instance, we should be asking how companies feel about employing 
immigrant labor. Studies by Delgado Wise and Cypher (2007) show immigrant 
workers are beneficial to industries as they allow companies to make profits while 
spending less on labor. On Mexico’s side of the border, we should be asking what 
circumstances dictate migrant life. Why do so many migrants make the decision to 
live divided lives, leave home, brave multiple day trips crowded into coyote (illegal 
immigrant smugglers) vans, endure high-speed chases with the border patrol (which 
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have often culminated in the tragic deaths of many illegal migrants), and suffer the 
desert, hunger, thirst, and potential exploitation by employers? 
The answer to this question is equally complicated. Yet, while both opposing 
and supporting sides of immigration in the U.S. have made pertinent arguments 
concerning immigration, it is apparent that a comprehensive understanding of the 
social, political and economic factors of the “sending” country, in this case Mexico, 
which lead migrants to the “receiving” country, the U.S., is lacking in the general 
public. As in the case of Saudi Arabia, a review of the U.S.’s economic relationship 
with Mexico as Mexico made neoliberal structural adjustments will reveal structural 
violence in the form of “Disease and death, unemployment, homelessness, lack of 
education, powerlessness,…misery,…hunger, thirst and bodily pain,” making
migration to the U.S. an adaptive strategy for many Mexicans (Kleinman 1997:227). 
U.S.-Mexican Relations, Neoliberalism and Structural Violence
The following history illustrates what has been the case for U.S.-Mexican 
relations since Mexico’s independence. Where the Mexican government makes
strides for its people, those benefiting from Mexico’s transnational ties quickly 
reprimand Mexico for “acting up” and neglecting that its interests are served when 
their interests are served first. The U.S. is no exception to these interested parties. 
Since Mexico’s independence, the U.S. has repeatedly contributed to structural 
violence in Mexico through its foreign policy. One such policy exacerbating this 
violence was NAFTA, a multilateral trade agreement with the U.S. and Canada that 
conferred trade advantages to foreign investors in Mexico and disadvantages (such as 
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wage decreases or loss of jobs) to Mexican workers. Though NAFTA was not 
specifically an example of neoliberal structural adjustment, it was introduced during 
Mexico’s era of neoliberal structural adjustment. Thus, NAFTA may not have been 
neoliberal according to the Washington Consensus, but to Mexico, its implementation 
and effects could easily have been tossed with the lot of neoliberal reform. In fact, 
neoliberal reform and NAFTA served as a “double whammy” of unfair economic 
conditions for Mexico’s government, workers and industries (excluding those that 
have managed to endure, such as glass and cement). Today, because Mexico has 
liberalized trade regulations in line with neoliberal structural adjustment requisites 
and opened its market to foreign investment, the country’s once successful industries 
have lost their hometown advantage against competition from foreign industries. 
Migration has helped to make up the difference. Because Mexico does not pay for the 
labor of its migrant workers, money brought home by workers is essentially profit to 
Mexico’s economy (Castaño 1984:13). Overall, the “savings from work abroad 
subsidize the state [Mexico], which is unable to fill the basic needs of the general 
population” (Castaño 1984:13). 
Unfortunately, this relationship does not always work out in Mexico’s favor.
Paired with NAFTA’s precepts, migration from Mexico to work in the U.S. is a 
doubled-edged sword for the country’s well-being (Carlsen 2008). Mexico recognizes 
migration remittances to be one of its most important ‘industries,’ bringing in $24 
billion for the year of 2007 (Solís and Corchado 2008:1). Thus, without migration to 
the U.S., Mexico would lose a main source of income. With migration, Mexico makes 
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money at the physical loss of workers, from those untrained to those educated (a 
phenomenon known as the “brain drain”), who could be making Mexico’s own 
industries more competitive (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007:133). Furthermore, as 
Mexico’s industries are put out of business by mega-corporations such as chicken 
producer Tyson, Mexico’s out-of-work employees lose again when they go to work 
for Tyson across the border, making small wages and enjoying few to no benefits 
(Carlsen 2008).
Speaking of Mexico’s industries, which ones have stayed afloat and how 
much profit do they turn? Despite the proposed successes of NAFTA that, for 
instance, Mexico’s exports increased by an annual rate of 16.3 percent from 1991 to 
2000, 78 percent of these exports come from maquiladoras (factories along the U.S.-
Mexican border where U.S. manufacturers use “low-cost labor” in Mexico to 
assemble products for export to the U.S.), making up the majority of the 90 percent of 
Mexico’s exports that go to the U.S. (Bailey 1988:28; Roett 1988:4-5; Delgado-Wise 
and Cypher 2007). What’s more is that of these exports sent to the U.S., 75 to 90 
percent were originally sent in unassembled and untaxed from the U.S. to Mexico 
because of free trade and then assembled and exported back to the U.S. In this way, 
the U.S. reaps the benefits of cheap Mexican labor (after all, maquila workers only 
earned about $4 to $10 a day in 2005) (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 2007). Thus, 
Mexico’s real export is labor from which it derives very little profit, unless, of course 
that labor is performed in the U.S. and pay is being sent back to Mexico. 
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How did it get to this point? Mexico’s dependence on the U.S. did not happen 
overnight. As stated above, Mexico has been in a relationship of dependence with 
other countries since it was first occupied in 1519. Mexico’s independence brought a 
new found hope for self-determination for the country. However, with little 
development or experience in the processes of development, Mexico had a hard time 
exploiting its resources. This is where the industrial revolution and modernization 
became so pivotal for Mexico’s relationship of dependency with other developed 
countries. In the early 19th century, the Industrial Revolution changed the course of 
societal development permanently as manufacturing and agricultural industries 
dramatically increased their production capacities (Bodley 2005). As Arrighi (2005) 
writes, industrialization and modernization were believed to be the keys to economic 
growth. Thus, Mexico accepted loans and investment from abroad to finance the 
development of its industries and agricultural sectors. But before this could happen, 
Mexico’s constitution had to be changed. 
Structural violence developed largely from changes made to Mexico’s 
constitution and social policies to prepare and adjust for neoliberal economics as 
required to receive loans from the IMF and the World Bank in response to the debt 
crisis of the 1980s. I unravel this development by discussing Mexico’s history 
beginning with the 1917 Constitution. Upon ratification, Mexico’s Constitution 
represented a revolutionary step in the country’s policies toward foreign investment. 
After a century of surrendering the resources of its lands to foreign parties, Mexico 
finally claimed ownership of its own riches in the 1917 Constitution. Article 27 of the 
67
Constitution in particular protected Mexico’s human resources by limiting the work 
day to eight hours. It also limited the size of privately owned estates. Most 
importantly, Article 27 promulgated a redistribution of privately owned large estates 
to land-poor Mexicans, satisfying their new right to ejido, or communal lands (Raat 
2004). 
These reforms provided both land and water resources “to a community or 
group of producers,…with each producer, or ejiditario [sic], obtaining usufruct 
(temporary) rights over a parcel of land and access to common lands” (Davis, 
Stecklov and Winters 2002:295). But the U.S. disagreed with Article 27, as it 
threatened its oil interests, businesses and other U.S. properties in Mexico. As a 
result, in 1920, the U.S. attempted negotiations with a Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce that would “prevent Mexico from treating article 27 retroactively” (Raat 
2004:116). President Obregón of Mexico, however, would not agree to these terms, 
so the U.S. refused to recognize Obregón as Mexico’s president. This strained 
Obregón’s ability to stay in office, as other revolutionary figures in Mexico were also 
vying for presidency. Feeling this pressure, in 1923, Obregón agreed to the Bucareli 
Accords, which stated Mexico would not nationalize land if it had already been 
developed (Raat 2004). This rescued several U.S. properties from confiscation and, 
upon accepting these terms, the U.S. restored its support for Mexico’s president, 
providing “arms, munitions, [and] shared intelligence” to suppress threats to 
Obregón’s power (Raat 2004:117). 
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Despite the Bucareli Accords, when Cárdenas assumed Mexico’s presidency 
in 1934, he redistributed 18 million hectares of land to “800,000 recipients, and the 
ejido share of the nation’s cultivated land rose from 15 percent in 1930 to 47 percent 
by 1940” (Klooster 2003:98). Still, Mexico’s industries and farms suffered from lack 
of development and modernization. For this reason, though ejidos guaranteed land to 
Mexico’s peasants, their low productivity was the most often cited disadvantage of 
the Agrarian Reform (a problem eventually influencing President Carlos Salinas to 
reform the program and eliminate the constitutional right to ejido land) in 1991 (Raat 
2004). Thus, under Cárdenas’s rule, Mexico also participated in the Green 
Revolution, bringing new machinery and technology such as pesticides, irrigation 
projects, synthetic nitrogen fertilizer and improved crop varieties developed through 
genetic engineering to Mexico (Bodley 2005). In the short run, the Green Revolution 
succeeded in increasing the production of food in Mexico, allowing for the 
sustenance of a growing population. For instance, the Green Revolution improved 
Mexico’s wheat production from importing half its wheat in 1943 to becoming 
completely self-sufficient in 1956 to exporting half a million tons of wheat by 1964 
(Dewar 2007). Some, however, have argued that in the long run the Green Revolution 
had several serious implications, including population growth (which was becoming 
increasingly more difficult to sustain), environmental degradation and the shift from 
traditional subsistence-based agriculture to mass production-based agriculture for 
export (Bodley 2005). The social and environmental implications of the Green 
Revolution that have contributed to immigration will be elaborated upon later. 
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Finally, under Cardenas, Mexico nationalized its oil companies in 1938 in 
retaliation to the U.S.’s refusal to obey Mexican labor laws and to bolster Mexico’s 
economy (Raat 2004:249). The U.S., preoccupied with the onset of WWII, did little 
to prevent this. Thus, in the 1970’s, Mexico’s oil boom seemed to be the solution for 
Mexico’s lack of economic and industrial development. It was believed that 
discoveries of oil in Mexico in the 1970’s could “generate the foreign exchange 
necessary to finance rapid economic expansion” (Philip 1987:4). However, under 
Lopez Portillo (1976-1982), Mexico spent most of its profits from oil “immediately 
and worse, leveraged its expected future income from oil in order to borrow
massively from international banks” who were more than happy to lend the surplus of 
petrodollars to Mexico (Trebat 1988:72). Thus, being fully confident in its future 
ability to pay off debts, like Saudi Arabia, Mexico received a devastating blow to its 
economy when oil prices suddenly plunged in the 1980s (Bennett 1988:89). To save 
its economy, Mexico agreed to take on neoliberal structural reforms in exchange for 
aid from the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S.
These reforms involved opening up markets, divesture in Mexico’s state 
industries, and privatizing parts of industries such as oil. The privatization of oil was 
no surprise, seeing as Mexico has long been among the top four exporters of oil to the 
U.S. (Saudi Arabia being another) (Raat 2004). In theory, once these industries were 
sold, Mexico could begin to repay its debt. However, from the beginning, Mexico 
was dependent on the United States’ technology to extract and process its crude oil,
and since the economic crisis of the 1980’s, Mexico has spent the majority of its 
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income from oil exports repaying its foreign debts, which have been “aggravated by 
high inflation and increasing interest rates” (Castaño 1984:10-11). Mexico’s
structural adjustments had served to support its lenders, not rescue its economy.
In order to repay this debt, Mexico’s government was forced to institutionalize 
structural violence by cutting funding for social welfare programs for public 
education, healthcare and housing. Middlebrook (1989:196) notes, the Mexican 
government also stifled wage increases, and “government subsidies for basic 
commodities, mass transportation, electricity, natural gas and gasoline were 
drastically reduced or eliminated.” As a result, the poor of Mexico paid the greatest 
price for investment mistakes made by the government and foreign banks (Raat 
2004).
Another requisite of neoliberal reforms was instigated in 1992: a second 
agrarian “reform,” which was more a reversal of the first agrarian reform. During 
negotiations with the U.S. and Canada, which had already signed NAFTA, President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari lifted many restrictions on the communal control of ejido
land and eliminated the constitutional right to ejidos. The Mexican public had mixed 
feelings about the reform. Though some were satisfied that the ejidos would become 
more privatized and that Mexico’s government was interested in modernizing its 
agricultural practices, others had doubts about what the reforms meant for the 
Mexican people. As Johnson states, “ejidos remained politically popular in Mexico in 
part because they served as a visible sign of the government’s continuing 
commitment to the principles of the [Mexican] revolution” (Johnson 2001:294). 
71
Nevertheless, Salinas was intent upon “market reform and international 
competitiveness” and pushed for privatization (Johnson 2001:294). 
The principles of the new agrarian law put an end to agrarian reform and land 
distribution. It provided security for private land owners. Conflicts would be resolved 
using Agrarian Tribunals as opposed to federal agrarian reform ministries. Ejidatarios
(owners of ejidos) had the right to “sell, rent, sharecrop or mortgage their land” to 
interested parties, including those private and foreign (“The Reform of Article 27 and 
Urbanisation of the Ejido in Mexico” 1994:327). The government also created a new 
agency called PROCEDE (Programa de Certificación de Derechos Ejidales) to help 
implement the provisions of the ejido reform (Yetman 1998:73). In this way, agrarian 
reform was advertised as a way “to give farmers both the ability and incentive to 
invest in new technologies and improved production practices” (Johnson 2001:292). 
However, the concerns of the Mexican masses about the reform were well 
grounded with Mexico’s inclusion in the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). Because Salinas believed in comparative advantages and had witnessed 
some Mexican industries benefit from trade arrangements with the U.S., he reformed 
Mexico’s market structure, including ejidos, to open Mexico to more private 
investment at the U.S.’s urging and “prepare” Mexico’s economy for the 
implementation of NAFTA (Johnson 2001). And though those industries associated 
with the PRI (Mexico’s previous governmental administration) benefited from 
NAFTA, the majority of Mexican industries found themselves at the mercy of U.S. 
economic interests. According to Bartra (2004:25), under NAFTA in 1994, “poultry, 
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pork, sheep and lamb, beef, wheat, rice, barley, coffee, potatoes, warm-weather fruits 
and tobacco, among others, plus all their derived products such as sausages, fats and 
food oils” all entered Mexico without tax from both the U.S. and Canada. Only corn, 
beans, powdered milk and sugar remained controlled, that is, until January 1, 2008 
when they were also liberalized under NAFTA. From this day on, these crops steadily 
lost value for local Mexican farmers. Furthermore, as Schulz (1996) writes, the 
second agrarian reform exacerbated inequality and “land concentration” became 
“much worse, as peasants, unable to compete with cheap foreign imports,…[came]
under growing pressure to sell out to large agroexport producers.”
Interestingly, the Clinton administration and several members of the U.S. 
Congress touted NAFTA as the job-producing solution to the immigration “problem”
in the 1990s, but, as Schulz (1996:144) notes, the Salinas administration estimated 
that the reforms would influence the emigration of 13 million people by the year 
2000. Overall, Schulz’s statements illuminate that a number of changes in Mexico’s 
industries, imports, exports, and environment due to Mexico’s market and agrarian 
reforms influenced the displacement of so many people, causing them to flock to 
Mexico’s cities to find work. There would not be enough work in the cities for these 
people. Wages would decrease, the standard of living would decline sharply, and 
more and more individuals looking for work and a decent living would look to 
migrate to the U.S. (Schulz 1996:145). 
The Reforms and Structural Violence
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Cruz-Torres (2001:112) states that the ejido reform paired with other “fiscal 
policies of the neoliberal economic model…institutionalized” structural violence via 
a decrease in public investment and an unequal distribution of natural resources that 
further marginalized and impoverished Mexico’s poor. Furthermore, in a study of 
whether or not the ejido reforms would allow farmers to “gain access to collateralized 
credit” and, therefore, increase the productivity of their land, Johnson (2001) argues 
that if PROCEDE was functioning as it should, there would be a positive correlation 
between ejido assets and participation in PROCEDE. Johnson does not find this 
correlation and, therefore, states that the ejido reforms cannot be expected to increase 
“the capital intensity and productivity of ejido agriculture” (Johnson 2001:304). As it 
turns out, Johnson’s results stem from the fact that in practice PROCEDE only 
benefited medium to large agroproducers, while small producers received small 
handouts instead of real investment in their industries.
Davis, Stecklov and Winters (2002) demonstrate similar findings regarding 
the productivity of land since the ejido reform in the article “Domestic and 
International Migration from Rural Mexico: Disaggregating the Effects of Network 
Structure and Composition.” The authors analyze the migration of Mexicans from 
ejido lands to Mexico’s cities and to the U.S. in search of work. The study 
demonstrates factors influencing migrants to leave the rural setting for urban Mexico 
and for the United States. Their data is taken from 5,260 individuals living in ejido
households in 1994 and 1997. The authors find that those households with family 
members employed in the agricultural sector “have the lowest household income, 
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show the lowest levels of agricultural modernization, are located in more isolated 
communities, and report lower levels of household infrastructure” (Davis, Stecklov 
and Winters 2002:296). Those households who report family members having 
migrated to Mexico’s cities to do non-agricultural work have “greater access to 
irrigated land and show higher levels of agricultural modernization” (Davis, Stecklov 
and Winters 2002:296). Finally, households reporting migrants in the U.S. are “linked 
with [household assets such as] cattle production” and “greater levels of rainfed land 
and cattle stocks” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). 
Thus, David, Stecklov and Winters (2002) find, in the case of the agricultural 
worker, the urban migrant and the migrant to the U.S., that despite Salinas’s 
neoliberal reforms to bolster Mexico’s economy, the reform of the agricultural sector 
especially has had little to offer Mexico’s poor. Opportunities for modernization or 
industrialization have not flourished in the agricultural sector. In fact, as the research 
of the authors shows, agricultural access, benefits and livestock have only become
available when families have received income from relatives working outside of 
agriculture in Mexico’s cities or in the U.S. This indicates a relationship between 
neoliberal reforms and those with the lowest income. Because many Mexican citizens
had little to no access to capital to begin with, neoliberal reforms achieved nothing for 
them. 
Those farmers who have resisted selling their lands have been unable to 
compete with the technology, subsidies, higher production and thus cheap prices of 
large-scale agricultural industries, and therefore have had to take the next step and 
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sell their ejido land to large agro-businesses who do have the capacity to develop and 
utilize the land (Bartra 2004). The next two options for subsistence are then 
migrating to work in Mexico’s manufacturing industries or to the U.S. Yet, as Carlsen 
(2008) reports, those working in Mexico’s industries, such as the poultry industry, 
have also suffered or been shut down as import controls and tariffs have been 
eliminated on U.S. goods in Mexico. In the case of the chicken industry, tariffs were 
eliminated on imported chicken from the U.S., causing individuals like Pedro Martin
(factory worker) and Lorenzo Martin (president of the Tepatitlan Poultry Farmers 
Association and owner of a successful poultry farm) to fear for their jobs (Carlsen 
2008). 
As a result, U.S. exporters such as Tyson chicken have pulled out two wins 
from the removal of tariffs on their products. Carlsen (2008) reports that those who 
lose their jobs then find themselves working for lower wages and with fewer rights 
for the very U.S. industries that put them out of work in the first place. In some cases, 
this is on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexican border, working at maquiladoras. 
Other times, this is on the U.S. side of the border, where illegal migrants work “bajo 
amenanza” (under threat) that if they do not comply with their working conditions, 
they will be deported (Carlsen 2008:2). 
Today, the CIA (2008:9) reports Mexico’s population is about 109,955,400 
people with an unemployment rate of 3.7 percent and an estimated 25 percent of the 
population suffering underemployment. This, along with “the 1994-5 Peso [sic] 
devaluation and subsequent inflation,” in which “the value of US dollars almost 
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doubled while Mexican wages fell” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002: 296)
motivated more migration. The dollars earned in the U.S. became essential for 
supporting families and communities in Mexico, including for the creation of small 
businesses and cooperative infrastructure projects (Cohen 2001; Martinez 2001; 
Hayworth 2006). The willingness of U.S. employers to hire migrant labor due to its 
exploitative advantages is another influential reason. These factors make it no 
surprise that between 1994 and 1997, the authors report an 8 percent increase in the 
number of ejido households with a family member in the U.S. (Davis, Stecklov and 
Winters 2002:295).  
Davis, Stecklov and Winters’s findings also show that migrants who chose 
non-agricultural work or migrated to the U.S. were able to increase their opportunities 
in life. For instance, non-agricultural workers in Mexico and migrants to the U.S. 
tended to “have higher levels of education” (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). 
Migrants to the U.S. specifically also tend to be young males, composing 80 percent 
of the sample (Davis, Stecklov and Winters 2002:296). This is especially interesting 
considering Ruben Martínez’s (2001) findings on the motivations of young Mexican 
men who migrate to the U.S. Martínez (2001) states that the desires of young males to 
migrate to the U.S. are to fulfill their sense of adventure, gain knowledge of the 
outside world, and, most importantly, “make something of themselves” in the sense 
of climbing the socio-economic ladder. It appears, then, there is a belief that the way 
to achieve these goals of self-fulfillment and overcome the structural violence caused 
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by NAFTA and neoliberal reforms in Mexico is not through employment in Mexico, 
but rather employment in the United States.
Environmental State of Mexico
One last effect of Mexico’s modernization and development projects such as 
the Green Revolution and neoliberal reform has been environmental degradation
throughout Mexico. As Cornelius and Myhre (qtd. in Cruz-Torres 2001:112) state, 
“increased mechanization of agricultural production, the opening of grazing lands to 
farming, more extensive use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides and 
other kinds of changes” created “new environmental problems, especially soil erosion 
and groundwater pollution.” As a result, massive deforestation, desertification,
destruction of marine habitats and industrial waste have been just some of the 
environmental effects of NAFTA and neoliberalism in Mexico today.
But how does environmental degradation affect Mexico’s economy? Cruz-
Torres (2001) states that at the time of the ejido reform, Mexico’s economy suffered 
in correlation with the exhaustion of its natural resources. Today, Cruz-Torres 
(2001:112) notes “81 percent of the land [in Mexico] is eroded and thirty-one of the 
nation’s most important aquifers are contaminated.” These environmental issues 
actually contributed to a drop in the productivity so needed from ejido lands. 
Deforestation led to desertification, making soil unproductive and decreasing 
production for agricultural sectors. Soil erosion also ran into the ocean, suffocating 
coastal reefs and depleting fish populations. In this way, when policies of the 1917 
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Constitution, which had protected Mexico’s delicate eco-economy, were removed, 
major industries such as fishing and agriculture suffered a major blow. 
Finally, as mentioned above, due to the failure of these industries, individuals 
desperate for work began to accumulate in urban areas. Yet a side effect of this 
migration was a rise in air pollution in Mexico’s cities. Over Mexico City, for 
instance, smog hovers due to the high altitude of the surrounding countryside, which 
traps air pollution in rifts and valleys. This pollution along with water shortages has 
resulted in serious health problems for Mexico’s people, who have overwhelmed the 
public service and resource sectors which have been unable to improve the situation 
(Philip 1987:2).
Solutions for U.S. Policy on Immigration
In sum, neoliberal reforms and Mexico’s opening up for the activity of 
transnational corporations have not been a success story for many in Mexico. The 
U.S.’s participation in this via development aid, NAFTA and U.S. influenced World 
Bank and IMF policies have not helped either. Both have come at the cost of social 
services and communal land ownership, and have not diversified Mexico’s economic 
opportunities. Competition with commercial agriculturalists has also forced many
ejido owners to seek new means of subsistence. They have traveled to the cities to 
seek better opportunities only to find job scarcity, labor surpluses, and the 
depreciation of wages. The ejido reform also exacerbated pre-existing environmental 
problems, depleting more natural resources, debilitating Mexico’s industries and most 
severely impacting Mexico’s already impoverished populations. Finally, the fact that 
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labor has become Mexico’s greatest export and the fact that “one-third of the 
economically active population [in Mexico] is in the so-called informal sector” (i.e. 
economic activity not taxed or regulated by the government) of employment illustrate 
the unequal trade relationship between the U.S. and Mexico (Delgado Wise and Furio 
2004:150,151). In this way, it is understandable that immigration to the U.S. has 
become the solution to Mexico’s “‘accumulation through crisis,’” as NAFTA,
neoliberal policy and structural violence are “impoverishing…millions of people, 
destroying communities [and] degrading…bioregions” (O’Connor qtd. in Cruz-Torres 
2001:111). 
On the other side of the border, Delgado Wise and Furio (2004) recognize that 
the U.S.-Mexican relationship has been historically beneficial to U.S. industries. 
However, as individuals such as Huntington, Hayworth and Appadurai note, fears that 
wealth and employment are becoming rare are being realized as more and more 
Mexicans cross the U.S. southern border and find work. Job security, healthcare, 
education, welfare and many others services of the U.S. government are all rumored 
to be strained and overwhelmed due to immigration. Yet, the blame has been placed 
on immigrants for these inadequacies in the American infrastructure, while those 
groups who attract and benefit most from migrant labor or outsource jobs such as 
U.S. industries, have only been recently and briefly identified as promoters of 
migration. 
Short term solutions to the Mexican immigration problem require recognition 
that both Mexico and the U.S. benefit from and need migrant work (Racheotes 2007). 
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Immigration initiatives prior to September 11th to make the U.S.-Mexican border 
more fluid should be reconsidered, allowing for more work visas, tighter border 
security, the initiation of guest worker programs, more regular, legalized migration to 
and from the border, and devoting certain sectors of U.S. industries to migrant labor 
(Delgado-Wise and Furio 2004). In addition, if the border becomes more accessible, 
the phenomenon of “entrapment” of illegal migrants on the U.S. side of the border, as 
described by Núñez and Heyman (2007), would become less common. Contrary to 
common knowledge, movement of migrants, both legal and illegal, is not only from 
Mexico to the U.S. Legal and illegal migrants also wish to return to Mexico for 
various reasons, most commonly just to go home for a bit, if not forever. However, 
due to heightened border security and restrictions on immigration since 9/11, 
movement across and back has become increasingly risky. And if one’s papers are not 
in order or if one is caught, future crossings of the border are less likely. Thus, 
movement of migrants has been greatly diminished and avoiding the risk of being 
caught has meant that more and more migrants reside in the U.S., never making the 
trip back to Mexico (Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007). If, however, regulation and
accessibility become the vocabulary and philosophy of immigration reform, the 
“immigrant threat” to American livelihoods will also subside.  
Long term solutions, as in the case of solutions to terrorism, will be discussed 
in the next chapter by way of Arrighi (2005) and Sklair’s (2005) discussions of the 
World Systems Theory and how it explains the connections between neoliberalism, 
structural violence and immigration. Using World Systems Theory theory, I argue 
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that immigration, like terrorism, is a global phenomenon that has global causes. 
Mexico is not solely responsible for its economic, social and political environment. 
Transnational organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank and other 
international investors have contributed to Mexico’s problems. The U.S. has done its 
part especially with NAFTA, creating a negative ripple effect in the form of structural 
violence on Mexican life. If the goal of U.S. immigration reform is to quell 
immigration, the U.S. must first consider its role in making migration a strategy of 
livelihood for those suffering poverty and instability in Mexico.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
Investigations of the causes of terrorism and the causes of immigration in the 
U.S. show that the two phenomena have similar causes. Though each phenomenon 
has a specific history, one constant in these histories has been imperialism. The most 
recent form of imperialism I have identified in instances of immigration to and 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. is neoliberal economic policy. Those who administer this
policy, such as the World Bank and the IMF, influence the G7 countries to help 
enforce the requirements of neoliberal structural adjustment. In countries where these
adjustments have been enforced, one potential result is the institutionalization of 
structural violence (consisting of social services being cut, labor exploitation being 
ignored, issues of poverty remaining unaddressed, and governments becoming 
unresponsive to the needs and demands of their people). What is most unfortunate is 
that these effects work against already disenfranchised groups of people. These 
groups respond in various ways to this extreme structural violence. For the purposes 
of this paper, I have discussed a terrorism response and an immigration response. 
Because the U.S. is one such enforcer of neoliberal policy, it has felt the effects of 
these responses. Thus, solutions to both immigration and terrorism should turn a 
critical eye to U.S. foreign policy.
This information, however, begs two questions: 1) why do we not also see 
Mexican terrorists and Saudi Arabian migrants? And 2) have I not simply solidified 
the notion that all immigrants are terrorists and vice versa? The answer to the first 
question requires that one consider the economic and ideological differences between 
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Mexican migrants and Saudi Arabian insurgents. As described in the previous two 
chapters, al Qaeda was able to carry out its Sept. 11th terror plan because it had the 
economic resources to do so. Osama bin Laden and others were able to fund this kind 
of attack. On the other hand, in Mexico, resources for this kind of action are lacking. 
Those who have organized and rebelled such as the Zapatistas have had to learn to 
conserve their resources for the sake of their cause. And, at best, in their 1994 
uprising, they were only able to confront the Mexican government. They did not have 
the resources to carry their message to the powers that be in the G8. Secondly, the 
Saudi terrorists of 9/11 operated under a unique religious philosophy that encouraged 
violent rejection of foreign attempts at determining the destiny of middle-eastern, 
Muslim countries. In fact, this philosophy stated very clearly that these individuals 
wanted to be nothing like their Western counterparts and outwardly protests U.S. 
occupation of its religious homeland. Mexican migrants on the one hand do not 
adhere to any particular religious teaching such as that of the 9/11 terrorists, nor do 
they appear to communicate any strong distaste for Western influence. In fact, to 
migrate to another country, at bottom, implies tolerance and, for many Mexicans, a 
desire to be submerged in Western influence whether to complete a rite of passage, 
increase status, or acquire remittances for “development” and capital for informal 
sector activity in Mexican communities. The Mexican migrant and the Saudi terrorist 
are not interchangeable.
The answer to the second question ties in with the first. In this paper, I have 
illuminated a set of circumstances whereby immigration and terrorism have similar 
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causes. I do not, however, claim that these causes necessarily lead to the same effects. 
The purpose of this paper has not been to argue that the terrorism and immigration are 
the same in terms of how they are carried out. The similarity I discuss lies in the fact 
that, in each case, individuals are faced with dire circumstances and they chose to do 
something about it in accordance with whatever societal, cultural and economic 
norms that exist for these them. Why does this astound us so? It is astounding because 
we do not know the circumstances that lead one to migrate or terrorize. 
Thus, there are interested parties such as transnational corporations, financial 
institutions, and governments interconnected with one another perpetuating these 
circumstances within the globalized capitalist system to make a profit, who must not 
only maintain their practices to continue making money but also explain to those 
unaware of these transnational activities the hows and whys of terrorist attacks and 
immigrant movement. This is where the rhetoric surrounding immigration and 
terrorism have been so instrumental. As it is elaborated upon in the next section, 
paired with the American ideology of individualism, the rhetoric surrounding 
terrorists – that they are hateful, intolerant and backwards – and migrants – that they 
are lazy, parasitic and incompetent – flows well with the American public. This is 
why the myths of immigration and terrorism were discussed at the beginning of the 
previous two chapters. The myths are the rhetoric, and the rhetoric is perpetuated so 
that transnational corporations, financial institutions and governments of the G8 can 
continue to have the public support that allows them, for instance, to invade another 
country supposedly guilty of housing WMDs and terror camps for the purpose of 
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establishing an oil foothold in the Middle East again. This rhetoric also allows 
companies and governments to condemn the movement of migrants across U.S. 
borders and maintain the legislation that allow them to profit from not having to pay a 
living wage, provide safe work environments or provide other benefits such as health 
insurance to legal workers. The fact that four of the 9/11 terrorists were also 
technically immigrants was simply an added perk that tied these two lines of rhetoric 
together in a double-whammy of threats to the American way of life.
Thus, in many ways, though individualism has its awe-inspiring perks, it has 
made Americans ignorant of a collective world. American individualism is in many 
ways the “third culture” to be considered in discussions of the circumstances driving 
individuals to immigration or to terrorism. The environment determining the 
perception of the perceiver is just as valid as what is perceived, and I will discuss the 
usefulness of World Systems Theory to illuminate these perceptions and their 
connections in the last section.
Ideological and Conceptual Impediments to Solutions to Immigration and 
Terrorism
Ideological Impediments
A critique of U.S. foreign policy, however, is an undoubtedly difficult course 
of action, as it requires a paradigm shift in how we view cause/effect relationships in 
times of disaster. Harry Triandis (1990:42) argued that “perhaps the most important 
dimension of cultural difference in social behavior, across the diverse cultures of the 
world, is the relative emphasis on individualism versus collectivism.” In the U.S., 
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individualism is the reigning ideology. Triandis (1990:42) defines individualist 
behavior below: 
In individualistic cultures most people’s social behavior is determined by 
personal goals…When a conflict arises between personal and group goals, it is 
considered acceptable for the individual to place personal goals ahead of 
collective goals. 
Individualism also has connotations of personal responsibility. If an individual 
“places personal goals ahead of collective goals,” the individual must do so knowing 
and having accepted responsibility for the consequences. 
Perhaps, then, one reason why solutions to immigration and terrorism in the 
U.S. have been unsuccessful is because immigration and terrorism have been viewed 
through the ideological lens of individualism; the choice to migrate or to terrorize has 
consequences for which only the individual is responsible. I argue, on the contrary, 
that to characterize the turn to terror and migration as purely individualized decisions 
is to misunderstand the complexity of each phenomenon. And, yet, it appears even 
recent attempts at understanding this complexity come up short. Even broader causes 
of terrorism and immigration have been chalked up to failures on the part of 
terrorists’ or migrants’ native countries. For example, Friedman (2005:323) writes 
that in a world becoming “flatter” through the global economy, some countries are 
able to mobilize and use free markets to their advantage, while others get “tripped 
up.” Friedman (2005:324) explains this phenomenon as a matter of culture: “the key 
factor is actually a country’s cultural endowments, particularly the degree to which it 
has internalized the values of hard work, thrift, honesty, patience and tenacity.” These 
values are all championed in American beliefs about individualism and are, 
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supposedly, lacking in countries that have not benefited from the globalized 
economy. Friedman (2005:324) continues, then, explaining the ideology of bin Laden 
and argues that this mindset cannot possibly operate in the globalized world because 
it is “tribalist,” against “glocalizing and collaborating,” and suspicious of “strangers.” 
It is for this reason that the Middle East remains underdeveloped and has born 
“terrorists,” who – faced with the supreme development and expansion of the West 
and the East – have lashed out at those who are successful (Huntington 1993). The 
partisan nature of this argument fails to recognize a relationship between those 
countries benefiting from and those suffocating under the global economy.
Similarly, on the topic of immigration, Hayworth (2006:81) writes, “The sad 
fact is that successive Mexican governments have found it easier – preferable, really –
to actively encourage illegal entry into the United States rather than to fix Mexico’s 
ailing economy and the corruption endemic throughout all layers of Mexican 
society.” Considering Mexico’s economic environment and the amount of 
immigration coming in from Mexico to the U.S., this argument is easy to make. 
Mexico’s foreign debt is $179.8 billion (CIA 2007). Ninety percent of Mexico’s total 
production is exported for very little profit to the U.S. (Delgado-Wise and Cypher 
2007). And Mexico makes about $24 billion a year off of migration remittances (Solís 
and Corchado 2008:1). How should we think about these figures? As causes or effects 
of Mexico’s relationship with the global economy and the U.S.? Or both? Once again, 
arguing as to which came first, Mexico’s economic exploitation or migration, does 
little to solve both issues. What is useful is to recognize Mexico’s economy depends 
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on remittances from migrant workers in the U.S. And the fact that Mexico’s economy 
is dependent on the U.S., and vice versa, ought to raise questions the U.S.’s role and 
power.
Conceptual Impediments
How, then, do these relationships exist? Eric Wolf (1982:3) wrote that “the 
world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes,” 
but “inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it 
falsify reality.” These segmenting inquiries bestow “nations, societies, or cultures 
with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded 
objects” (Wolf 1982:6). In this way, Wolf (1982:5) argued that the segmentation of 
our global histories and interconnections contributes to a phenomenon in which each 
“runner” in the developmental race of a country “is only a precursor of the final 
apotheosis and not a manifold of social and cultural processes at work in their own 
time and space.” For example, in the U.S., our nation’s history has been taught as an 
epic battle for morality. During the Cold War, the West was considered to be the 
modern world, while the East had submitted to communism – where “life was cheap 
and slavish multitudes groveled under a variety of despotisms” (Wolf 1982:7). If the 
West could circulate the vaccine of modernization, the third world would be saved 
from the outbreak of communism. This “history” has made the U.S. the end-all be-all 
“force for good in the world;” and, today, America is believed to be the superpower 
that restores order and enforces freedom and justice all over the world (Hunter 
1991:116). 
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Historically, the “saving graces” of America, for instance, have been quite 
twisted around the world. This is one reason why “salvation” philosophies such as 
neoliberalism, modernization and individualism are so contested in the international 
arena. Wolf (1982:7) argues, in the 1960’s, during the rise of communism, when 
“peoples in other climes began to assert their political and economic independence 
from both West and East…we assigned these new applicants for historical status to a 
Third World of underdevelopment;” and we acted in superpower fashion to restore 
“order.” However, as in the case of Vietnam, eventually social groups began 
mobilizing for the “enactment of their rights” and the philosophy of class conflict no 
longer seemed adequate to explain these social problems (Wolf 1982:8). Thus, 
according to Wolf (1982), to better our understanding of these conflicts, we adopted a 
conceptual divide between functionalist theories of social integration and political 
economy and relegated each to its own discipline. The result of this divide has been 
the segmentation of a most certainly interwoven world; and our comprehension of 
conflict has been partial ever since. As Bourdieu (1998:39) critiques,
Who would link a riot in a suburb of Lyon to a political decision of 1970? 
…All the critical forces in society need to insist on the inclusion of the social 
costs of economic decisions in economic calculations. What will this or that 
policy cost in the long term in lost jobs, suffering, sickness, suicide, 
alcoholism, drug addiction, domestic violence, etc., all things which cost a 
great deal, in money, but also in misery?
Examples of how this conceptual divide has resulted in the misinterpretation 
of international events include the consequences of U.S. economic and military 
activity in Saudi Arabia and Mexico. I have argued that U.S. policy in each country 
has had consequences in the form of terrorism and immigration. Yet, as seen in 
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explanations put forth by Hayworth and Huntington, in many ways, culture has been 
essentialized as the cause of these international issues. By the creed of these authors, 
each “society” has responded to their own failures with terrorism and migration. This 
simplified explanation of ‘failure’ exemplifies the segmentation of interrelated parts 
and the denial of responsibility for the consequences of these global relationships. 
The last problem in finding solutions to immigration and terrorism is in 
identifying the global processes affecting these phenomena. We have only recently 
conceptualized and developed the vocabulary to describe them. As Roger Rouse 
(1991:8) states, suddenly the language used that describes “nation-states and national 
languages, [of] coherent communities and consistent subjectivities, [of] dominant 
centers and distant margins no longer seems adequate.” Thus, discussions of the 
processes of globalization have been highly convoluted. For example, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1998:19) wrote 
the rationalism of the mathematical models which inspire the policy of 
the IMF or the World Bank, that of the law firms, great juridical 
multinationals which impose the traditions of American law on the 
whole planet, that of rational-action theories, etc. – is both the 
expression and the justification of a Western arrogance, which leads 
people to act as if they had the monopoly of reason and could set 
themselves up as world policemen, in other words as self-appointed 
leaders of the monopoly of legitimate violence, capable of applying 
the force of arms in the service of universal justice.
One idea seems to run constant through several critical definitions of globalization –
the belief that once the “neutral mask of ‘globalization’” is removed, “raw 
imperialism” will be revealed (Harvey 2005:91). For instance, Nassar (2005:25) 
states that colonialism was “the cruelest amalgamation of globalization…as millions 
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of people perished under the guns of colonists.” Today, Nassar (2005) argues that 
globalization operates via neoliberalism and is enforced by economic, political and 
military pressure in the international arena. The neoliberal processes of globalization, 
then, instigate structural violence, as the expansion of empire through the expansion 
of economy suppresses the dreams of many in the effort for world power (Nassar 
2005:27).
The Interrelated Causes of Terrorism and Immigration
Recent migratory and political terror movements call for these ideological, 
conceptual and linguistic impediments to be overcome. Moreover, because those 
migrating or terrorizing identify global causes of their problems, we must understand 
their rationale to address these issues. For example, Martínez (2001) reports that in 
1994 several Mexicans described a phenomenon called “la crisis” – an economic 
crisis in which the stock market dropped, the value of the peso plummeted, and 
unemployment rates were high. Meanwhile, the U.S. “enjoyed throughout the late 
1990’s a historic boom in practically every corner of its economy, and among the 
fastest-growing was the ‘service sector’” (Martínez 2001:8). As described above, the 
backdrop of these two events was NAFTA, which took effect after President Carlos 
Salinas instigated neoliberal reforms of Mexico’s constitution, restructuring the 
agrarian sector and opening Mexico to private investment, mainly from transnational 
corporations (Johnson 2001:294). And today, Mexican migrants report, “Because of 
la crisis, you borrow[ed] a thousand dollars and risk[ed] your life sneaking across the 
U.S.-Mexico border” to make a living (Martínez 2001:10). 
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Bin Laden has also justified the call for Muslims to “kill all Americans and 
their allies – civilians and military,” arguing:
for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam 
in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating 
to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its 
bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring 
Muslim peoples (qtd. in World Islamic Front Statement 1998:1).
And, finally, in the 1990s, in what may be regarded as an interesting cross between 
what motivates migrants and terrorists, a revolutionary group called the Zapatista 
National Liberation Army (EZLN) emerged in Chiapas, Mexico, demanding an end 
to the neoliberal policies of the U.S. that created extreme structural violence in their 
lives. Leader subcomandante Marcos, a strong critic of globalization, exploitation, 
commercialization and neoliberalism, argued that “NAFTA represented a ‘death 
certificate for the indigenous peoples of Mexico, who are dispensable for the 
government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari’” (Marcos qtd. in Harvey 1996:188). 
Interestingly, Harvey (1996:188) states, because the Zapatistas chose to rebel on the 
day in which NAFTA became effective, it is clear the guerrillas understood the 
connection between the international arena, their government’s economic policies and 
their local experience. These three examples show that individuals are making the 
choice to migrate or to turn to subversive activity upon recognizing a link between 
their local situations and global powers. 
Recognizing the Links between Global Phenomena
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Because neoliberalism has the potential to affect severe social and economic 
disparities and to institutionalize structural violence once it has been accepted, 
Bourdieu (1998:40) argues that the precept of neoliberalism as “a strictly economic 
policy” to engender development “is not necessarily economical – in terms of the 
insecurity of persons and property, the consequent policing costs, etc.” As long as 
neoliberalism reigns as a supreme ideology for economic development, individuals, 
such as migrants or those who turn to terrorism, will continue to adjust, adapt, and 
resist for survival – all while they are blamed for the very forces that threaten them to 
begin with. While neoliberal policies for economic development continue dominating
governmental authority, states will continue to be undermined by the 
individualization (or privatization) of social responsibility. What once belonged to the 
public sector and was the state’s responsibility in terms of social protections and 
services is delivered by the private sector. Structural violence by neoliberalism
emerges in this way. Thus, Bourdieu (1998:40) is justified when he states, “…there is 
a need to radically question the economic view which individualizes everything.” 
Questioning neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank and the U.S.’s 
enforcement of them may actually reverse the effects of regressed states and diminish 
the turn to options like immigration and terrorism. 
To better our international relations, the segmentation between social relations 
and political economy and the limits of individualization must be addressed. In the 
1960’s, Andre Gunder Frank (1967) began answering this call with his contributions 
to Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, in which it is argued the world is 
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organized between those societies who compose the “core” and those societies who 
compose “periphery” of the world. Those on the periphery were underdeveloped and 
in a relationship of dependence with the core – the developed, metropolitan, capitalist 
center of the world. According to Frank, the core made the periphery into “dependent 
satellites” by extracting “the surpluses produced in the satellites to meet the 
requirements of the metropolis [the core]” (Frank 1967).
Frank’s arguments were elaborated in 1974 as several individuals, including 
Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin expanded on World Systems Theory, stating 
(as summarized by Kegley and Wittkoph 2001:133) that
the perpetual and widening inequity among states is explained by capitalism’s 
international division of labor and production, which over time allows the 
wealthy core countries to become richer while the peripheral states supplying 
raw materials and cheap labor become poorer. 
Originally, as Wallerstein argued, the world system was composed of the European 
core and its peripheries. However, with the industrial revolution, the world system 
expanded from Europe and became a global system (Bodley 2005). The expansion of 
the global system created a core composed of countries of the northern hemisphere, 
while the periphery was composed of countries in the southern hemisphere. The 
northern core tended to be wealthy because it was modern and industrialized while 
the southern periphery was poorer because it was less modern and industrialized. 
However, as industrialization and the global system grew, modernization projects 
developed in the south (Bodley 2005).
Since then, some have argued that the north/south divide clause of World 
Systems Theory can not hold true because modernization and industrialization of the 
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south has taken place. However, as Arrighi (2005) argues and as we have seen in the 
case of Mexico, modernization and development have scarcely worked out for the 
periphery. Though development and industrialization projects in the south grew, 
economic growth in the south did not. To be sure, in 1960, the south’s per capita GNP 
was 4.5% that of the north and 4.6% in 1999 (Arrighi 2005). Much of this was due to 
the fact that periphery countries struggled as they competed with new commodities, 
markets, trade routes, innovations and new sources of supply and demand within the 
world system (Schumpeter 1954; Vernon 1966, 1971; Arrighi 2005). Periphery
countries also found themselves at a shortage for resources and dependent on the 
resources of the core to become modernized. Ironically, in several cases, the 
resources for which the periphery was short were the very resources the core actively 
removed from the periphery – all while it advertised the mission of modernization 
and development to draw profit from this extraction (Frank 1967; Wolf 1982; Kegley 
and Wittkopf 2001; Bodley 2005).
These disadvantages aside, even when modernization was profitable, it was 
mostly only the elites of the periphery who could afford and benefit from it (Sklair 
2005). Sklair (2005) refers to these elites at the transnational capitalist class (TCC): 
individuals with both global and local perspectives concerning their transnational 
interests. These individuals may be
1. Those who own and control major transnational corporations (TNCs) and 
their local affiliates (corporate fraction)
2. Globalizing state and interstate bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction)
3. Globalizing professionals (technical fraction)
4. Merchants and media (consumerist fraction) (Sklair 2005:59).
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The IMF and the World Bank fit into the picture as they helped to finance, govern 
and enforce these modernization projects under the direction of the TCC core (Arrighi 
2005; Sklair 2005). Thus, as in the case of underdeveloped states such as Saudi 
Arabia and Mexico, neoliberal policy of the IMF and the World Bank enforced by 
U.S. dominated TCC’s around the world turned these countries into “dependent 
satellites” on the periphery of the “metropolitan,” capitalist center (Wolf 1982:22). In 
this way, underdevelopment and structural violence, the exhaustion of resources, and 
the undermining of the state have been the standards for neoliberal influenced policies
of TCC. These arrangements have led to the consideration of migration and terrorism 
as strategies for change. 
Long Term Solutions for U.S. Policy on Immigration and Terrorism
Wolf (1982) argued that to view the causes of conflict and global phenomena 
in terms of Marx’s materialism and modes of production, instead of pure 
individualization, would better capture the motivations of individuals as determined 
by a broader structure of social and economic forces. It would seem then that a 
holistic human science calls for universalism. However, though Marx sought holism
to understand humanity, he did not advocate for a universal human history. He, in 
fact, argued “against those who wanted to universalize Society, or the Market, or the 
Political Process” (Wolf 1982). Indeed, as Wolf (1982) argues, universal histories 
contribute to some entities, such as the U.S., assuming a superpower attitude over the 
world. Unlike universalism, Marx believed there were different modes of production 
throughout various human histories due to the many possible “combination of 
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elements” per mode of production (Wolf 1982:21). Modes of production were 
specific to certain societies. Marx’s relativity of modes of production relates to my 
argument as lack of respect for the governments, environments, economies, and 
people – the modes of production – of Saudi Arabia and Mexico have yielded 
structural violence, immigration and terrorism.
One holistic way of understanding the globalized world is through the use of 
World Systems Theory. Addressing the issue of U.S. foreign policy as a form of 
globalized structural violence using World Systems Theory will contribute to the 
creation of a holistic human science that takes all disciplines and phenomena into 
account in attempts to explain conflict. Once this is implemented, the U.S. will be 
better equipped to avoid structurally violent action and those economic policies that 
push individuals to migration and terrorism. 
There is, however, one unavoidable impediment to solutions to U.S. policy on 
immigration and terrorism. In his book Patrolling Chaos: the U.S. Border Patrol in 
Deep South Texas, Lee Maril (2004:305) argues that technology may advance and 
laws passed, but the greatest challenge to the mission of the Border Patrol comes 
down to human agency: “While new technologies are vital in combating terrorism, 
ultimately it is human decisions and actions that are essential…” and these decisions 
will begin with individuals. Likewise, long-term solutions to immigration and 
terrorism are long term because they will also require human decision and 
determinacy. Change on this level will not happen over night. People must 
collectively become critical of their present perspectives and ideologies. This will 
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happen when they are encouraged to be more informed about current events, 
educating themselves in world history, and actively participating in the future of the 
U.S. by, for example, voting in elections. These forms of human agency will reveal 
how the paradigm of the segmentation of political economy and social relations and 
the dominance of individualization have shaped our thinking on globalized issues; 
and, once this constraint is finally loosened, more comprehensive solutions to issues 
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